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INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of the Korean War i n  1953, S w i e t  - 
American competition has shifted from the mi l i ta ry  sphere 
t o  the development of the underdeveloped countries. It was 
the Purpose of t h i s  study t o  compare the American aid  pro- 
gram in one of these countries, India, with the Soviet aid 
program, and t o  make suggestions on how economic and p o l i t i -  
c a l  cooperation between the United States  and India can be 
made more e f fec t ive  i n  ass i s t ing  India 's  economic develop- 
ment, and stopping the expansion of communism. Since Soviet - 
American aid  competition has not been confined t o  India, re f -  
erence w i l l  be made t o  underdeveloped countries in general 
fim time t o  time. However, India w i l l  remain the foca l  
point  of t h i s  study. 
The problem contained i n  t h i s  study is by no means 
being investigated for  the f i r s t  time, nor can the wri ter  
take complete c redi t  for  a l l  of the opinions or cmclnsions 
contained hereln. However, t o  the wr i t e r ' s  howledge, t h i s  
i s  the f i r s t  study t o  take t h i s  form or t o  contain a l l  of 
the  topics  which w i l l  be developd herein. 
-themore, 
these w i l l  be the first conclusions and saggestions based 
on these topics  as  a whole. 'Ihe wri ter  f i l l y  recognizes 
2 
the  i m e n s i t ~  of t h i s  study, but believes t h a t  a study can 
be so l imited t h a t  conclusions based upon it have l i t t l e  
value. On the  other hand, t h i s  wri ter  hows  t h a t  some 
s tudies  become so broad tha t  conclusions based upon them 
lose  t h e i r  spec i f ic i ty  and, thus, t h e i r  value. With t h i s  
in m b d ,  t h i s  examination wi l l  be developed t o  a degree 
t h a t  conclusions based upon it w i l l  be of value, but not  
t o  an i n t e n s i t y  t h a t  the purpose of the inquiry i s  l o s t  in  
c o l l a t e r a l  problems. 
a Since World War I1 the world has become polarized i n t o  
two spheres of influence, the Soviet and the American. In 
recent  years, yet  another influence has come i n t o  world 
a f f a i r s ,  t h a t  of the "uncommitted nations.* India, the  
l a r g e s t  democracy i n  the world, has become the main spokes- 
man for  t h a t  group. !Rms, India has became of increasing 
significance t o  both Rassia and the United States ,  a s  the 
s t ruggle  f o r  power between those two nations continues. It 
was because of India 's  increasing significance t h a t  It was 
chosen a s  the focus of t h i s  study. 
In  the development of this study emphasis w i l l  be 
placed f i r s t  on the problems of India's economy, and how 
t h i s  democracy i s  attempting t o  a l l ev ia t e  them. An attempt 
w i l l  be made t o  reconcile the magnitude of the problen with 
the a t t en t ion  given t o  it. This wi l l  be especial ly  t r u e  in 
describing India 's  population problems. Emphasis will then 
3 
be placed on ass is tance  t o  the Indian economy by the United 
Sta tes9  by the  Soviets ,  and on suggestions and conclusions 
pe r t i nen t  t o  the  purpose of t h i s  study. 
In the study which follows, both s t a t i s t i c a l  and 
chronological methods of procedure have been u t i l i z e d .  The 
s t a t i s t i c a l  method has been employed, not  f o r  complete 
accuracy, but f o r  the purpose of making a meaningful corn- 
par ison of magnitudes in Soviet - American a id  competition. 
The chronological procedure has been u t i l i z e d  a s  a con- 
venient  means of presenting the h i s t o r i c a l  development of 
the United S t a t e s  a id  program. 
The primary sources f o r  t h i s  study were The New York 
Times, and the United S ta tes  De~artment of S t a t e  Bul le t in .  
The New York Times was u t i l i z e d  because of i t s  exce l len t  
7--
repu ta t ion  a s  an impart ial  observer, because it i s  a f a c t u a l  
source, because of i t s  ready a v a i l a b i l i t y  a t  the Drake Uni- 
v e r s i t y  Library,  and because of i t s  very complete index. 
The De~artment af Sta t e  Eul le t in  was u t i l i z e d  because i t  was 
tho hes t  avai lable  source f o r  government documents per ta in ing 
t o  t h i s  study. In addit ion,  a few secondary sources of infor-  
mation, mostly books and per iodicals ,  proved helpful  i n  Tar- 
ious  p a r t s  of t h i s  study- 
CHAPTER I1 
MAJOR PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE ImDLAN ECONOMY: 
India i s  one of the poorest nations In the world. 
The annual per capi ta  income of India was estimated a t  only 
$68 in 1959, while the average calor ie  consumption was only 
two-thirds tha t  recommended by the United Nations Food and 
Agricul tural  organization.' If India i s  t o  r a i s e  i t s  stand- 
ard of l iv ing  it is  imperative t h a t  t h i s  democracy produce 
more food and control i t s  r i s ing  popnlation, These a re  the 
two paramount problems affecting the India economy. 
I. POPULATION PROBLEMS 
On March 31, 1959, India's population was estimated 
2 
a t  415 mill ion,  A t  the current r a t e  of Increase of 1.3 per  
cent per  year India 's  population w i l l  be approximately 750 
mill ion in f o r t y  years. 
Oddly enough t h i s  rapid increase i n  population is  not 
due t o  a r i s i n g  b i r t h  r a t e ,  In f a c t ,  the b i r t h  r a t e  has 
declined from 46.4 per thousand in the 1921-1931 period t o  
York Timea, January 5, 1959, pa 45. 
'Jbid., December 19, 1959, Pa 7. 
5 
43.2 i n  the  1941-1951 period.' A t  the  same time the  death  
r a t e  has  decreased from 36.3 per thousand i n  the 1921-1931 
period t o  31.0 In  the 1941-1951 period. Thus the  d i f fe rence  
between the  b i r t h  r a t e  and the deat.h  vat.^. whqrh a a + a + n - s  
---- - -- - - 'V , " L * * I L I  U" "-a "AA.-.-w 
t he  increase  or  decrease i n  popnlation, has been expanding 
because the  death r a t e  has f a l l e n  more quickly than the b i r t h  
r a t e .  
In  comparing such s ign i f i can t  f a c t o r s  a s  dens i ty  of 
populat ion and the  annual r a t e  of population Increase In India 
wi th  o ther  countr ies ,  it can be concluded t h a t  neither i s  the 
- - - - -- ---- 
source of he r  population problems. For example, Ind ia ' s  
annual r a t e  of increase i n  population f o r  the  period 1953-1957 
was 1.3 a s  compared with 1.8 in the United S t a t e s ,  3.6 In 
2 China, and 2.8 i n  Canada. The dens i ty  of population i n  India 
i s  120 people per square kilometer. The corresponding f igu re  
i n  the  United S t a t e s  i s  22, i n  China It i s  264, and i n  Japan 
266, The source of India ' s  population problem Is the  maldis- 
t r i b u t i o n  of her  many mil l ions  of people. On March 13, 1960, I 
The New York Times reported Ind ia ' s  annual population increase  
'I 
had r i s e n  t o  7 r n ~ l l i o n . ~  1 
The Indian Government, i n  an e f f o r t  t o  curb the r i s i n g  
population, has adopted an o f f i c i a l  policy of family  planning. 
Pursuant t o  t h a t  pol icy  India now observes a nRational Family 
~ n e  unr LFU n a u u ~ ~ s  slra I. u u u r  c U A  w w  ~ A L  WVI LU 
t on (New York: ~ n i l e d  Nations Information Aqcncy, l ~ 5 P ) ,  $??-be- 
'united Nations, r h o k  forr 
1,958 (New York: The U n i t ~ d  Natlons, 
3 ~ h e  New York Times, March 13, V I ,  p. I?. 
---
6 
Planning Day" t o  dramatize the need f o r  e f f ec t ive  b i r t h  
con t ro l  t o  help r a i s e  the standard of living.' Also, India 
p lans  t o  spend $10,500,000 on the promotion of family plan- 
ning during i t s  Second Five Year Plan ending i n  1961. 
During t h i s  period the Indian Government w i l l  e s t a b l i s h  five 
hundred c l i n i c s  i n  urban areas,  and two thousand In  r u r a l  
a r eas  i n  order t o  spread Information on family planning. 2 
It i s  planned t h a t  these c l i n i c s  w i l l  serve approximately 
f i f t y  thousand people each. 
The Indian Government's policy of family planning 
which has been in existence f o r  the  pas t  nine years has  been 
a disappointment. It has gradually gained public support, 
but ignorance, supers t i t ion ,  r u r a l  t r ad i t i ons ,  and the  l ack  
of f a c i l i t i e s  and trained soc i a l  workers have made the  r e s u l t s  
neg l ig ib le .  Typical of the problem facin?  India in t h i s  
f i e l d  i s  the f a c t  t ha t ,  even i f  each of the f a ~ i l y  planning 
c l i n i c s  handle?  the f i f t y  thousand people it i s  su;?posed t o ,  
f ive  out  of s i x  InZians woulC s t i l l  have no f a c i l i t f e s .  
The Srprersing r c s u l t s  i n  f a x i l y  planning have not 
changed Indian Govern~ent p o l i c y  o r  the subject. h fact, it 
i s  now un2ertaking even ~ 3 s ~  ?ras t ic  steps t o  curb the ere r -  
I,ncrcc.,cing poprlation. For cxa-nalp, the i n d i a n  ?a-.ily r71erning 
f oar? has reconaen2rd t h a t  b i r th  control  be the  p r n ? r i n ~ . n t  
f e a t u r e  of the Third Five Year Plan, beginning In Apri l ,  
'The -- New Pork Times, December 19, 1959, p. 7. 
2 ~ b i ~ .  , January 12, 1960, p. 70. 
1961 Also, the Indian Government has decided t h a t  the 
problem i s  so b ig  tha t  no tangible r e s u l t s  can be obtained 
by propaganda and canvassing, or even by large scale  f r ee  
d i s t r ibu t ion  of contraceptives. Therefore, it now seems 
I 
t h a t  the  next government policy i n  regard t o  t h i s  policy 
w i l l  be voluntary s t e r i l i za t ion ,  A t  the present the Indian 
Government i s  allowing federal  employees six working days off 
for  s t e r i l i z a t i o n  operations, and i s  providing s t e r i l i z a t i o n  
f a c i l i t i e s  a t  s t a t e  owned hospitals  f o r  volunteers.* On 
March 7, 1960, The New York Times correspondent i n  New Delhi 
wrote t h a t  there  i s  a good poss ib i l i ty  t h a t  govermnent leg is -  
l a t i o n  on s t e r i l i z a t i o n  w i l l  be forthcoming i n  the  near 
iuture .3  
11. THE PROBLE! OF CASTE 
Castes may have B r ~ l l g l o u s ,  t r i b a l ,  or r a c i a l  founea- 
t i m ;  but thr four tradit ion21 divisions a re  by ~ccupat ion .  
The highest  caste  i s  the Erahrnans who zre the  p r i e s t s ,  
scholars,  and teachers. %e next caste i s  the Kshatri jas 
which i s  the ruler-soldier  class.  Below the Kshatri jas are  
the Vaisyas who are the n i d d l e  cless farm owners, t raders ,  
businessmen, a r t i sans ,  shopkeepers, and merchants. The 
b i d  -. 9 Yarch 7, 1960, p. 9. 
*1bla. ,  February 16, 1960, p. 1. 
3 ~ b ~ ~ .  , March 7, 1960, p. 9. 
lowest caste  a r e  the Sndras who a re  the working class.  
Those who have no caste are known a s  the untouchables. These 
people perform only menial tasks such as  sweeping.' The 
divis ion does not stop a t  the caste boundaries however, fo r  
each cas te  i s  subdivided many, many times. Thus India has 
been so s t r a t i f i e d  by the caste system tha t  social  and eco- 
nomic mobility, often considered so v i t a l  t o  the improve- 
ment of an economy, has been somewhat paralyzed. 
Recognizing the hand lca~s  of the caste svstem. the 
- * - , 
Indian Government has o f f i c i a l l y  abolished it in the Indian 
Constitution. To provide a po l i t i ca l  s t a tus  fo r  the nntouch- 
ables ,  which would have been impossible i n  the past ,  the 
Consti tution provides tha t  the percentage of the untonchables 
in the lowest huuse of the s t a t e  leg is la tures  must be a t  
- 
l e a s t  equal t o  t h e i r  percentage i n  India's t o t a l  population. 2 
India 's  industr ia l izat ion has caused the caste  system 
t o  begin t o  disappear in the c i t i e s ,  but not i n  the vil lages.  
Although India now has laws providing f ines  and imprisonment 
f o r  any prac t ice  of caste discrimination, it has been 
l m o s s i b l e  t o  l e ~ i s l a t e  it out of existence. 7 
111. LANGUAGE PROBLEMS 
While the caste  system segments India social ly ,  the I 
b l e a n o r  Roosevelt, b d l a  and the Awaken* East 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1 9 5 3 r p .  133. 
'3 
' ~ o b e r t  Trumball, Z See I n d i ~  (Mew York: W i l l i a m  
Sloan Associates, 14561, p. 151. 
languages has many dialects .  In f a c t  the 1951 Indian Census 
l i s t e d  720 languages and d ie lec t sO2  Problems brought about 
by having so many languages are exemplified by the f a c t  t ha t  
Indian currency has "Rupee" written on it i n  nine d i f fe ren t  
s c r i p t s a 3  And yet even more t rag ic  i s  the f a c t  t ha t  as  l a t e  
a s  1955, 82 per cent of the Indian population could ne i ther  : 1 
read nor wri te  any of these languages. 4 
The Indian Government has adopted Hindustani as  the 
o f f i c i a l  language of i t s  country, but English will remain i n  
o f f i c i a l  use u n t i l  1965. 
IV. WATER PROBLEIS 
Lack of water is the dominant problem in increasing 
Lndiafs agr icul tura l  productivity. This problem i s  exem- 
p l i f i ed  by the f ac t  tha t  India devotes 30 per  cent of her 
annual budget t o  I r r iga t ion  projects. 
Basically, the problem i s  retaining the water. 
9 
language problem segments India In  yet another way. The 
Indian Constitution recognizes fourteen major languages for  
o f f i c i a l  national or provincial use: English, Bengali, m- 
jabi, Urdu, Guzarati, Marathi, Assamese, Oriya, Telegu, 
Tamil, Malayarn, Kanorese, and ~industani . '  Each of these 
'~ack Finagan, India Today (St. Louis: The Bethany 
Press, 19551, p. 113. 
10 
Ninety-five per cent of India 's  r a i n f a l l  comes during the 
monsoons which l a s t  only two or three months. The heavy 
r a i n f a l l  of the monsoons causes floods, and then leaves 
the s o i l  parched for  the r e s t  of the year.1 If India i s  
t o  e f fec t ive ly  u t i l i z e  these monsoons, it i s  es sen t i a l  t h a t  
she build dams, reservoirs,  and extensive i r r iga t ion  systems. 
V. PROBLEMS OF ImFLATION 
In f l a t ion  i s  a perennial problem in  India 's  economy. 
One reason f o r  the Inf la t ion in  India i s  extensive d e f i c i t  
spending by the Indian Government. Other inf la t ionary 
pressures are generated from world-wide sources. By 1950 
2 pr ices  i n  India were b00 per cent above 1939 levels .  From 
1956 t o  1960 the world price of the cap i t a l  equipment which 
India needs f o r  the successful fulf i l lment  of her Second 
Five Year Plan had raised 25 per cent, 3 
VI. FSLIGIOK Am) TRE INDIAN ECONOXY 
Religion i n  India has caused a s p l i t  i n  the  country, 
a tendency towards apathy by the population, and an addi t ional  
burden upon the food supply. 
Religion was the factor  behind the India - Pakistan 
' ~ h e r t e r  Bovles, Ambassador ' a  R e ~ o r t  (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 19541, p. 161. 
2 
me New Y~rh Time$, January 4, 1950, P. 76. 
3m., March 22, 1960, p. 7. 
s p l i t  i n  1947. The separation i n t o  separate countries, which 
were formerly one, had d i re  e f fec ts  upon the economies of 
each, because of mutual dependence on the other's products. 
India 's  three main re l inions a re  Hinduism, Jainlsm. 
exis tences  determine one's present status.' Such a bel ief  
causes the  Indian people t o  have an apathetic a t t i t u d e  toward 
t h e i r  own existence, and seems t o  minimlze the ambition neces- 
sary  f o r  s e l f  improvement. 
In India, the cow and the monkey a r e  sacred t o  many 
people. Thus t h e i r  economy i s  faced with an addit ional  burden 
in feeding these animals, while the proportion of the food 
l e f t  f o r  the general populace Is decreased. 
I n d i s  has had trouble i n  keeping her foreign exchange 
a t  a high enough leve l  t o  buy necessary cap i t a l  equipment f o r  
her Second Five Year Plsn. India 's  F i r s t  Five Year Plan con- 
centrated on developing means of producing more food. By 
1956 foreign exchange drainage had stopped as India reported 
self sufficiency in supplying her food needs.2 The Second 
1 
l ~ i n e g a n ,  ep. &. , p. 116. 
2 Y~rk, Timez, January 4, 1956, p. 49. 
and hddhism. 
is prevalent. 
- - -- - - - - - - -- 7 ------ 7 
In each of these re l igions the idea of "Karman 
According t o  t h i s  doctrine, deeds of previous 
- 
TtI. FOREIGhi EXCHAHGE PROBLEMS 
Five Year Plan produced another problem in foreign exchange, 
because it emphasized indus t r ia l  developnent. It was 
imposslble for  India t o  keep her exports high enough t o  
match her imports, and soon her foreign securi ty  holdlngs 
dropped below the upper minimum prescribed by the Reserve 
Bank of India Act, August 14, 1957.l 
Since the above date the problem of foreign exchange, 
although s t i l l  exist ing,  has been minimized by the f a c t  t h a t  
countr ies  aiding India have shown an increased willingness t o  
accept Indian currency. 
V I I I .  INDIA - 
i n t o  
s t a t  
By the Par t i t ion  of India Act of 1947 India was divided 
two countries,  India and Pskistan. The 562 princely 
es of India were given the r igh t  t o  accede t o  e i t h e r  
Pakiaten o r  India with the idea t h a t  the predominantly Moslem 
s t a t e 8  w u l d  accede t o  Pakistan, and the Hindu ones t o  India. 
Dnrlng t h i s  time six million Moslems f led  from India t o  
Pakistan and f ive  million Hindus and Sikhs f l ed  from Pakistan 
t o  India. 2 
Since t h i s  pa r t i t ion  India and Pakistan have been i n  
constant conf l ic t .  
12 
PAKISTAN RELATIONS 
a dispute arose over possession 
- - . - 
_ _ I *  -- - 
of the S ta te  of Kashmir, and a war between these two naslons 
-- 
lJ.b14., August 14, 1957, p. 35. 
 r rum ball, pp. . , p. 46. 
13 
broke out. The United Nations was successPul i n  gaining a 
cease f i r e  i n  Kashmlr, h ~ +  nn w a a l  a ~ l m + 4  her  LA&- em..-a I --- a S W A U  U L V I I  i iaa V C C I I  L U U U  
f o r  t h i s  problem. 
Another confl ic t  between these two countries has been 
over r i g h t s  t o  the Indus River Basin. This r ive r ,  so impor- 
t a n t  f o r  i r r i g a t i o n  uumoses. f l w s  first thrnnsh Tndfa and 
- - - - - - - - -- - - ---- - -C)-- ---- -- -- 
then i n t o  Pakistan. Both countries have claimed dominant 
r i g h t s  t o  t h i s  r ive r  and have thus been i n  constant conf l ic t .  
By 1960, re la t ions  between India and Pakistan had 
reached an a l l  time high, with the peaceful settlement of 
a long standing border dispute. The International  Bank f o r  
Reconstruction and Development i s  now undertaking the develop- 
ment of the Indus River Basin, which promises t o  produce sa t i s -  I 
I 
fac tory  r e s u l t s  fo r  both comtr ies .  Another reason fo r  the  
rapprochement between India and Pakistan is China's menacing 
gestures on the Indian border. Some leading government o f f i -  
c i a l s  of both India and Pakistan are  even advocating a defense 
1 
a l l i ance  between these two nations. A 
The long struggle with Pakistan has produced a t r e -  
mendous burden on the Indian economy. The dis locat ion of many 
people, the Kashmir War, and rel igions conf l ic t s  have a l l  
taken t h e i r  t o l l .  India, where the per capi ta  income has jus t  
reached 968 per year, has found it necessary t o  devote 
IThs &vlr Tim-. - A n w e m b ~ r  14. 1 
- 
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approximately 30 Per cent of her annual budget t o  mi l i ta ry  
purposes ever since i t s  Independence. 1 
I X *  INDIA - CHINA RELATIONS 
Until  recently India 's  re la t ions  with Red China had 
been qui te  amicable. Having two thousand miles of common 
border, these two countries have had many years of good re la -  
t ions .  Since Red China took power on the mainland, India has 
constantly advocated tha t  she be given the seat  i n  the United 
Nations now occupied by the Taiwan Government. In 1954, 
India and China signed the "Five Principles of PeaceFul 
Coexistence." 
These peaceful re la t ions  abruptly changed in the summer 
of 1959, when Red China occupied areas claimed by India. China 
claimed t h a t  the KcMahon Line of 1914, which separates India 
and Tibet ,  did not bind her because she was not a party t o  the  
agreement. India, on the other hand, claims t h a t  the lands 
belong t o  her by t rad i t ion .  The dispute involves f i f t y  than- 
sand square miles of t e r r i t o r y  of which Red Chlna now occnples 
twelve thousand square miles. 
Although the area involved i s  quite large,  it i s  of 
l i t t l e  importance t o  India. The t e r ra in  is very rugged and 
only a few Indian shepherds l i v e  there. What is a t  stake i s  
India ' s  prest ige.  Thus India has increased her budget s i x t y  
1 
, February 28, 1954, p a  ?. 
million dollars 'or 
Defense spending now amounts t o  $571,766,000 or 30 per cent 
of the t o t a l  budget.' 
15 
the f i sca l  year beginning April, 1960. 
1 
e o r  e ,  March 1, 1960, p.  8. 
CHAPTER I11 
INDIA'S EFFORTS TO DEVELOP HER ECONOMY 
India has not idly  waited fo r  assistance t o  r a i s e  
her standard of living. In f a c t  India has undertaken two 
ambitious f i v e  year development programs. The f i r s t  was 
f o r  the  years 1951 t o  1956 and the second fo r  1956 t o  1961. 
Although a l l  of India 's  goals have not been reached by these 
plans,  there  has been some very encouraging progress. 
I. INDIA'S FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN 
As the  information contained in Table I, page 17, 
indica tes ,  emphasis of the F i r s t  Five Year Plan was on 
increasing food production by means of lmprovlng i r r iga t ion ,  
power and transportation, farm technology, and commnnity 
development. 
The r e s u l t s  of India's F i r s t  Five Year Plan were 
encuuraging. In her first attempt a t  planned development 
India was able t o  reach 87 per cent of her goal. During t h i s  
f i v e  year period India became self  suf f ic ien t  i n  food, and 
foreign exchange drainage fo r  food h y i n g  was stopped.' ihs 
'%oh of India 's  success i n  Increasing her food aro- 
duction i n  Its F i r s t  Five Year Plan was due t o  a ser ies 'of  
favorable monsoons throughout the  f ive  years of t h a t  plan. 
Unfortunately, the monsoons have not been a s  favorable 
during India ' s  Second Five Year Plan and the problem of food 
shortages has reappeared. See Infra., p. 9. 
TABLE I 
PLANNED EXPENDITORES FOR T ~ T A  1 8 - ---  --.---- -
FIRST FIVE YFAR PLAN* 
Agriculture and Community Development . . . .  8 727 
Transport and C o m i c a t i o n s  . . . . . . .  
Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . .  '%" 3 
3 V C l u l Q e L - V 1 ~ w s  . . . . . . . . . . .  000 
Rehabilitation . . . . . . . . . . .  170 
1 . a .  a m  o r  r r  r -  104 
I r r i g a t i o n  and Power . . . . . . . . .  l , i 2 9  
@ - - a - l  Q*--* -a- r ~ n  
I 
I 
Miscellaneous - - - -  
( i n  millions) 84,138 
*Data obtained from The New York Times, December 9, 
1952, p. 16. 
community development program resulted i n  the reclamation of 
895,000 acres ,  i r r iga t ion  of 1,500,000 addit ional  acres,  
establishmant of 12,000 new achaals, establishment of 30,000 
adul t  education centers, and 28,000 miles of new roads. 
Malaria dropped from an Incidence of 60 per cent t o  2 per cent. 1 
The Indian industry a l so  showed progress. A t  the end of 
the plan i n  A p r i l  of 1956, indus t r ia l  production had increased 
22 per cent.* The Industr ia l  Index showed 97.2 i n  1947, 146.5 
in 19%, and 157.9 In 1955.~ ihe most s igni f icant  and 
-- - - 
; ra t ion,  Internatlonab 
Coo~srat9 on A d m u s t r a t i  On Pronress: India (Washington: 
pa 22. Gov~rnnent Printing Office, 
 he -- New - York -9. Tlmcs January 4, 1956, p. 49. 
10 
meaningful s t a t i s t i c ,  however, was i n  nat ional  income, which 
rose  18 per  cent  during the  period of the F i r s t  Five Year 
Plan. 1 
11. INDIA'S SECOND FIVE YEAR PLAN 
On A p r i l  1, 1956, India s ta r ted  on her  second f i v e  year 
period of planned economic development. The Second Five Year 
Plan has emphasized the i ndus t r i a l  segment of Ind i a ' s  economy, 
while maintaining her  work i n  community development a t  a high 
l e v e l .  Encouraged by the success of the F i r s t  Five Year Plan. 
- 
I n d i a ' s  new plan cal led  f o r  expenditures of near ly  four  times 
a s  much, ~15,120,000,000 a s  compared t o  $4,138,000,000 fo r  
2 
the  f i rs t  plan. A nat ional  income increase of 25 per cen t  
-3 
was sought as compared t o  18 per cent f o r  the  first plan.3 
It was evident from the s t a r t  t h a t  Ind ia ' s  Second Five 
Year Plan was overly optimist ic .  For example, the  Indian 
Government planned on $1,680,000,@00 in  aid from abroad 
althaugh none of t h a t  sum had ye t  been comnitted t o  then. It 
c a l l e d  f o r  p r iva te  investment of 65,040,00@,000 f o r  which 
there  was no assurance, and 20 per cent  of the  plan was t o  
be financed by d e f i c i t  spending. By August of 1957, Ind i a ' s  
economy was s t ra ined i n t e r n a l l y  by i n f l a t i o n  and ex t e rna l ly  by 
l T L 4 A  T l q l ~ r  33 1 QGC(. n- 9- 
31bld., Ju ly  22, 1P56, p.  Q .  
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balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  and it was necessary t o  
a t  the Program t o  the core projects. Many projects  which 
had already been s tar ted had t o  be abandoned, grea t ly  adding 
t o  the waste of the plan. 
The key reasons for  the f a i lu re  of the Second Five 
year Plan a t  the time it was cut  to  the core were: (1) India 
d i d  not  ge t  the aid she expected, (2) in f la t ion  caused the 
goal8 t o  be unreasonably high for  the funds tha t  were avail-  
able ,  (3) the or iginal  estimates of costs  were much too low, 
and (4) the food problem reoccurred a f t e r  a year of poor 
monsoons, 1 
The r e s u l t s  of India 's  economic planning, although 
discouraging i n  par t s ,  has been successful over-all. Under 
these plans agr icul tural  production has increased about 30 
per cent ,  while indus t r ia l  production has increased 50 per 
cent.  The Gross National Product has been growing a t  about 
4 per cent annually, while the population increases a t  about 
2 per cent. Thns the annual increase In national  lncome Is 
about 2 per cent. 2 
l ~ b l d . ,  September 29, 19?7, IV, p. 9. 
' ~ n i t r d  S ta tes  Department of State ,  e t a  No. h2 
(Wa.hington: Government Printing Off ice ,  M S 5 ,  19601, 
p,  780. 
CHAPTER I V  
THE ADMINISTRATION, MOTIVES, AND NATURe 
OF UmITED STATES A I D  
Following the Second World War the United States  
began giving aid t o  war torn countries through the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Organization, and the 
Marshall Plan. When Europe had regained i t s  economic 
s t rength ,  the United States  began t o  give aid t o  another 
group of countries, the  underdeveloped countries. In h i s  
inaugural speech of 1969, President Truman s e t  the trend 
f o r  t h i s  type of aid when he said, wOnly by helping the 
l e a s t  for tunate  of i t s  members can the human family achieve 
a decent, sa t isfying l i f e  t h a t  i s  the r i g h t  of a l l  people. n l  
This  was the famous "Point Four." 
United Sta tes '  foreign aid has been of three d i f f e r -  
en t  kinds: n i l i t a r y ,  economic, and technical. The n i l i t a r y  
ass i s tance  has been given in  the form of weapons and money 
with the purpose being t o  combat the spread of comrmmlsn. 
Economic assistance may be i n  the form of supplies, but i s  
usua l ly  money. It i s  given t o  help increase the standard of 
l iv ing  in underdeveloped countries. Technical ass is tance I 
'EU ene Stalcp, Future a Underdevelmea 
C e i e s  7 New York: Harper and B ~ o t h e r s ,  la?+), p -  52. 
has the same purpose a s  economic assistance. but i s  i n  an I - - I . - - -  -- --- --- 
educational form;. teaching others t o  help themselves. 
1. ADMINISTRATION OF UNITED STATES AID:  I 
- ---- - ---. 
A BRIEF FEVIEwl 
The United States  f i r s t  began giving aid t o  other 
nat ions  fallawing World War I1 through the United Nations 
Relief  and Rehabilitation Administration, A s  an ac t ive  
pa r t i c ipan t  i n  t h i s  program the United States  contributed 
75 per cent  of the t o t a l  sum expended by t h a t  organization. 
Under the Truman Doctrine of 1947, the United S ta te s  
~ 
began t o  give act ive mil i tary assistance t o  countries ,, ~ 
threatened by communism. Largely through t h i s  plan, Greece 
and Tnrkey were able t o  withstand the Comm~is t  th rea ts  t o  
t h e i r  nations,  
The Marshall Plan was a lso  s ta r ted  in 1947. To admin- 
i s t e r  t h i s  program the Economic Cooperation Adnlnistration 
was created i n  lqb8. Through the e f f o r t s  of the Marshall 
Plan the countries of Europe were able t o  reach t h e i r  pre- 
war economic strength. 
In 1949, the United States  helped t o  organize the  
North Atlant ic  Treaty Organization. Pursuant t o  the responsi- 
b i l i t i e a  of being a member of tha t  organization, the United 
- 
Sta tes  Congress passed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act t o  
New T lnea  i s  the source f o r  t h i s  section. I 
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the Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries 
and %rke~, Iran, Korea, China, and the Philippines 
t o  build t h e i r  mil i tary power. 
In President Tmman ' s inauguration address of 1949 
hi3  fourth  point of h i t e d  States foreign policy stressed 
the need of the United States  t o  share Its wealth with the 
underdeveloped countries through technical cooperation. 
Soon t o  become known as  the HPoint Four Program," Congress 
gave the idea formal authorization i n  the Act f o r  Inter-  
na t iona l  Development of 1950. This Act authorized the 
United S ta te s  t o  par t ic ipa te  in and t o  es tab l i sh  in te r -  
na t iona l  technical cooperation programs. This was the first 
ac t ion  by the United States  t o  a s s i s t  nations outside of 
Furope, or  which d i d  not need immediate assistance t o  de ter  
commrulism. 
In  1951, the United States  Congress passed the Futual 
Security Act, which authorized contirmatibn of foreign aid,  
and a l s o  established the Mutual Security Agency t o  take over 
the m c t i o n s  of the Fkonomlc Cooperatinn Administration. 
The emphasis of the Mutual Security Program was on secnrity.  
Operation of the mil i tary program Was t o  be handled by the 
Department of Defense, while the economic and technical  
ass i s tance  was t o  be administered by the State  Deparbent* 
United States  now began t o  a s s i s t  India i n  her develop- 
ment program. In 1952, the United States  author- 
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$50,000,000 fo r  the establishment of the India - American 
Technical Cooperation h d .  India contributed an equal sum 
t o  the fund and a lso  jolned i n  i t s  administration. This 
fund, which was used primarily for  the study of food pro- 
duction, was the f i rs t  concrete step i n  a continued program 
of Indian - American aid relat ions.  
The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1951 fur ther  
emphasized United States security. lhis a c t  provided t h a t  
a l l  mi l i ta ry ,  economic, and technical assistance would be 
terminated if the recipient  country permitted trade of cer- 
t a i n  s t r a t e g i c  materials t o  the Soviet Bloc. 
In 1952, the Mutual Security Act was amended. The 
amendment authorized continuation of the foreign aid pro- 
gram, but a t  a reduced amount. 
The Mutual Security Act was once again amended i n  
1953 with the r e s u l t  tha t  once again the United Sta tes  for- 
eign aid program waa reduced. Act ivi t ies  of the Mutual 
Security Agency, and other aid programs, were t o  be combined 
under a new agency, the Foreign Operations Administration. 
In 1954, the Mutual Security Act was amended once 
more. The United States  foreign aid program was once again 
reduced In  amount. The amendment a l so  provided f o r  the 
abolishment of the Foreign Operations Administration in 
June of 1955. The mil i tary program of assistance was t o  be 
administered again by the Department of Defense, while other 
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ass is tance  programs were t o  be administered by the Depart- 
ment of State.  
In 1954, the United States Congress passed the Agri -  
c u l t u r a l  Trade Development and Assistance Act (Public Law 
480). Under t h i s  Act, United States agr icu l tura l  surpluses 
were t o  be sold abroad for  foreign currencies. The proceeds 
were then loaned back to  the recipient  country t o  finance 
economic development within the i r  country. This law was t o  
prove t o  be of great  assistance in  improving Indian - Ameri- 
can a id  r e l a t ions .  The Department of State  established the 
In terna t iona l  Cooperation Administration t o  administer the 
a id  programs for  which it was responsible. The Department 
of Defense continued t o  administer mil i tary aid. 
In January of 1958 the Development Loan Fund was 
established under the Mutual Security Act t o  make loans t o  
foreign countries payable i n  the recipient  country's own 
currency. Its purpose was t o  aid such underdeveloped 
countr ies  a s  India In  concentrating on long range, economic 
growth projects.  
The l a t e s t  move by the United States  i s  an attempt 
t o  spread the  responsibi l i ty  of aid t o  underdeveloped 
nat ions  t o  other advanced countries of the world. A s tep  
in t h i s  d i rec t ion  is the International Development Authority 
which was created i n  the l a t e r  months of 1959. This  new 
organization w i l l  operate i n  connection w i t h  the Internat ional  
25 
Bank f o r  Reconstruction and Development, and wi l l  concen- 
t r a t e  on loans which the World Bank might not  grant because 
of an excessive r i s k  being involved. 
BY 1960 the United States was contributing t o  the 
development of underdeveloped countries on an internat ional  
bas i s  through the International Monetary h n d ,  the Inter- 
na t iona l  Bank for  Reconstruction and Development, the Inter- 
na t iona l  Finance Corporation, the Export - Import Bank, !Ihe 
Development Loan Rind, the International Development Author- 
i t y ,  and several  agencies on a regional basis. 
11. MOTIVES EEHImD mJITED STATES A I D  
United Sta tes  aid has been given t o  such underdeveloped 
countr ies  as Indle for  three reasons: (1) humanitarianism, 
(2 )  economic purposes, and (3) for purposes of security. 
Hurnanitari&sm. The motive of humanitarianism played 
a l a rge  r o l e  In the foreign aid pol ic ies  of the United Sta tes  
mti l  the Korean War. For example, the A c t  for  International  
Development s ta ted as  the United Sta tes '  motive: 
The peoples of the United States  and other nations 
heve a comon in te res t  in the freedom and i n  the eco- 
nomies and the social  progress of a l l  peoples- Such 
progress can further the secure grovth of democratic 
ways of l i f e ,  the  expansion of mutually beneficial  
conmercc, the development of international  under- 
standing and good wi l l ,  and the maintenance of world 
peace. 1 
l ~ t s l e y ,  ep. ~ 0 ,  P. 32. 
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It is  dmbt fu l  tha t  the humanitarian motive of 
United S ta te s  a id  can be considered important in explain- 
ing the ac t ions  of the United States  i n  the past ,  or i n  the 
future .  Unfortunately, aid programs are devised and promoted 
i n  an administrative and po l i t i ca l  se t t ing t h a t  gives very 
l i t t l e  consideration to  hnmanitarianism. The agencies which 
a r e  responsible for  the administration of these programs must 
annually j u s t i f y  them t o  a Congress which i s  concerned with 
economy. 
Economic hiotivation. Those who advocate aid f o r  eco- 
nomic purposes s t r e s s  the f a c t  tha t  such assistance makes 
more customers f o r  United States '  products and i s  a l so  a 
source of nav supplies. A s  the productivity of the under- 
developed countries increases, so wl l l  t he i r  a b i l i t y  t o  
supply the  United States  with raw materials. As t h e i r  stand- 
ard of l iv ing  increases, so wi l l  the markets f o r  United 
S t a t e s '  products i n  foreign countries. 
No matter how g o d  the economic arguments of foreign 
aid  may be, there i s  l i t t l e  evldence of economic motivation 
behind United States  aid. For example, where the United 
S ta te s  gives the most aid i s  not where they do the most 
trading. Also, foreign trade has not been of great  s igni f i -  
cance i n  the development of the United Sta tes ,  nor i s  there  
much evidence t h a t  a curtailment of United Sta tes  foreign 
t r ade  would grea t ly  a f fec t  the growth of the United S ta te s  
economy. 
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Secu w* Since the Korean War, the United 
S ta te s  a id  program has been dominated by securi ty  purposes, 
&., the  t h r e a t  of c ~ ~ i s m .  A s  Secretary of State  
Chris t ian Herter said ,  "Our problem a s  f a r  as  securi ty  i s  
concerned i s  communismmml The United Sta tes  De~artment pf 
S t a t e  Bul le t in  i l lu s t r a t ed  the problem when it quoted Lenin 
a s  saying: 
F i r s t  we w i l l  take Eastern Europe, next the masses 
of Asia and f i n a l l y  we w i l l  encircle the l a s t  bastion 
of c a p i ~ a l i s m  - the United States. We sha l l  not have - 
t o  a t t ack  t, it w i l l  f a l l  l i ke  an overripe f r u i t  i n t o  3 our hands, 
The United States  aid program is  now almost e n t i r e l y  
administered through the Mutual Security Act. The motives 
of t h a t  a c t  are:  
. . . to maintain the security and t o  promote the 
foreign policy of the United States by authorizing 
mi l i ta ry ,  economic, and technical assistance t o  
f r i e n d l y  nations t o  strengthen the mutual securi ty  and 
individual and collective 6efenses of the  f r ee  world, 
t o  develop t h e i r  resources In  the in te res t  of t h e i r  
secur i ty  and independence, and the national  i n t e r e s t  
of the  United States t o  f a c i l i t a t e  the effect ive par- 
t i c i p a t i o n  of these countries i n  the United Nations 
system fo r  collective defense. The purpose of . . . 
the  Act f o r  International Development. . . sha l l  here- 
a f t e r  be deemed t o  include t h i s  purpose.3 
By 1960 the United States  maintained 250 major over- 
seas bases and had mili tary al l iances with forty-two nations 
' ~ n l t e d  States  Department of State ,  m l e t b  No. 38 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, May 5, 15155), p. 
731 
2 
1b14. , p* 732. ' ~ t a l e y ,  qp. u., p m  33. 
28 
1 of the  f r e e  world. Thus the s t r e s s  on securi ty  continues. 
111. THE NATURE OF UNITED STATES A I D  
The United States  aid to  underdeveloped countries i s  
administered primarily through the Mutual Security Act. Under 
the  provisions of tha t  Act there are four categories of United 
S t a t e s  aid:  (1) mi l i ta rp  assistance, (2 )  defense support,  
(3) development assistance,  and (4) technical cooperation. 
Mi l i ta ry  ass is tance i s  self-explanatory. Defense support i s  
economic a id  supplied t o  cer ta in  countries not receiving 
s i g n i f i c a n t  mi l i ta ry  assistance in order t o  maintain economic 
and p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y  i n  the recipient  nation. Development 
ass i s tance  takes place primarily through the Development Loan 
2 
Fund, which was explained In a previous section. Technical 
cooperation involves the sharing of s k i l l s ,  howledge, and 
techniques r l t h  underdeveloped countries a t  t he l r  request. 
' ~ n i t e d  Sta tes  Department of State,  Bul.l_stw No. 38 
(Washington: Government Printing Off ice ,  Map . , lo%), p. 
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CHAPTER v 
UNITED STATES A I D  TO I N D I A  
India has continually ref'used any type of mil i tary 
ass i s tance  from the United States. Therefore, United 
S t a t e s  a id  t o  t h a t  country has been in  the form of economic 
ass i s tance  and technical assistance. 
I. ECOEOMIC ASSISTANCE 
On May 7, 1960, the United States and India signed 
an agreement which provides for  the sale t o  India of 
$1,276,000,000 worth of wheat and r i c e  over a four year 
period under the Agriculture Trade Development and Assistance 
A c t  of 1954.l Under t h i s  agreement, $1,076,000,000 wi l l  be 
made avai lable  t o  India for  economic development, one half  
as loans,  and one half as grants. The other $200,000,000 
wil l  be used fo r  United States '  expenses i n  administering 
the  program. This i s  the f i f t h  such Public Law 680 agree- 
ment between the  United States  and India, and the t o t a l  
amount involved in these agreements now stands a t  approxi- 
mately $2.5 b i l l ion .  2 
1 The amount involved i s  equivalent t o  one shipload of 
gra in  being sent  t o  India every day fo r  four years. United 
S t a t e s  Department of State,  w e t @  NO* 42 (Washington: 
Government h i n t i n g  Office, Kay 30, 1960), pa 889- 
- 
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aforementioned wreernent i s  the most recent one i n  
United S t a t e s  - Indian economic aid re la t ions .  It i s  by f a r  
the l a r g e s t  agreement between these two countries and shows 
a growing concern of the United States for Indian economic 
development, a concern which dates back t o  1950 and the Inter-  
na t iona l  Development Act. Since that  time the United States  
has loaned o r  granted approximately $3 b i l l ion  t o  India. 
TABLE I1 
UNITED STATES A I D  TO INDIA TO 
AUGUST 31, 1959* 
Outright Grants . . . . . . . $'+90,300,000 
Loans Payable in Dollars . . . . . 361,600,000 
Loans Payable i n  Rupees . . . . . 728,800,000 
Funds Reserved f o r  Use of 
the United State8 
Governlent .  . . . . . . . . 188,600,000 
Private  United States 
Agencies . . . . . . . 43 ,bO0,000 
+Data obtained from The New York ---, September 26, 
1959, P O  3. 
~y ~ ~ 1 7  27, 1959, United States loans t o  India tota led 
$642,000,000 a t  of India's t o t a l  foreign debt of 
$1,369,200,000.1 of a t o t a l  of ~85 ,000 ,000  of foreign 
s r a i s t r n c e  given t o  India during her F i r s t  Five year Plan, 
2 
the  United S ta te s  contributed $500,0@09*00* 
1 r , July 279 19599 P. 33. 
2 m., March 7, 1956, P. 6. 
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&&S, - American economic a agreements work. 
Typical of the Public Law 480 agreements was the one slgned 
August 30, 1956. I he  t o t a l  amount involved i n  t h i s  agree- 
ment was $360,100,000. Under t h i s  agreement the United 
S t a t e s  delivered $305,900,000 worth of wheat, r i c e ,  cotton, 
and other items from the United States agr icul tural  surpluses 
over a three  year period. The a m m t  of $54,200,000 was then 
paid by the United States for  f re ight  charges. The amount 
?. 
used f o r  economic development was $234,000,000, and only on 
t h i s  sum did the Indian Government pay in te res t .  An uutright 
grant  amounted t o  $!?t,000,000. The remainlng $72,000,000 was 
spent by the United States  in  India fo r  various purposes, such 
a s  bullding a new United States Embassy i n  New Delhi. The 
aechanics of the agreement were as  follows: the United Sta tes  
sold the ag r i cu l tu ra l  surpluses t o  the Indian Government who 
i n  turn sold the grain t o  i t s  people. The proceeds f roa  these 
l o c a l  sa l e s  were then loaned by the United States  t o  India, 
r a t h e r  than being used t o  repay the United States  a t  t h a t  
time. 1 
Typical of how s t r a igh t  loan agreements work, and how 
the agencies coordinate the i r  programs, i s  the March 2, 1958, 
agreement between the United States and India. By t h i s  agree- 
ment, India was loaned 6150,000,000 by the  Export - Import 
'lbid., August 30, 1956, P a  1. 
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Bank, and $75,000,000 by the Development Loan Fund of the 
In terna t iona l  Cooperation Administration. The Export - 
Import Bank loan i s  t o  be repaid i n  f i f t e e n  years a t  an 
annual i n t e r e s t  r a t e  of 5a per cent. The $75 million loan 
by the  Development Loan h d  carr ies  an in te res t  r a t e  vary- 
ing from 33 per cent for  s t a t e  projects t o  53 per cent f o r  
p r iva te  projects.  The length of time fo r  repayment var ies  
with the  individual  loan. 1 
.- 
Trends of United States economic aid in India. The 
t rend i n  recent  years i n  United States economic aid re la -  
t i o n s  with India has been characterized by the establishment 
of development agencies such as  the Development Loan F'und, 
the  c rea t ive  use of United States '  agr icul tural  surpluses, 
and encouraging the expansion of the number of countries 
giving a id  t o  such underdeveloped countries a s  India. 
The trend i n  development agencies has been encouraging. 
For exanple, the Development Loan h d  already has applica- 
t i o n s  f a r  exceeding i t s  capi ta l ,  and the future c a l l s  for  even 
more f inds  t o  be channeled through t h i s  agency. Ln 1959 the  
ac tua l  amount expended through the Development Loan F'und was 
$66,000,000. In 1960 it wi l l  spend an estimated 8 1 7 5 , 0 0 0 , ~ ~ ) ;  
and i n  1961 $300,(?00,000.~ 
' ~ b l d * ,  March 2, 1 9 9 ,  p.  26. 
'united State. Department of State ,  e t  ~ 0 . 6 2  
(Washington: Government P r i n t i n g  Wfice, F e 8 ,  1~60), 
p. 210. 
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The crea t ive  use of agricultural surpluses has a l so  
been encouraging. Through Public Law 480 the United Sta tes  
has u t i l i z e d  i t s  surpluses t o  the great assistance of India. 
In f a c t  over 50 per cent of United States aid to  India has 
been i n  t h i s  form. 1 
The expansion of aid t o  such underdeveloped countries 
as India among the countries of the f ree  world has l ikexise  
been encouraging. The establishment of the International 
Development Authority, mentioned ea r l i e r ,  i s  noteworthy in 
t h i s  respec tm2 Up t o  May 16, 1960, f ree  wor ld  sources of 
a id  t o  India,  other than the United States,  amounted t o  
$1,300,000,000; whfle the Soviet Bloc t o t a l  was 
11. TECHKTCAL ASSISTANCE 
Section 418 (a)  of the Act for  International Develop- 
ment of 1950 defines technical assistance as: 
Programs far  the internatlbnal  Interchange of 
technical  knowledge and s k i l l s  to  contribute t o  the 
balanced and integrated development of the economic 
resources p d  productive capacities of underdeveloped 
countries.  
There a re  three d i f fe rent  ways t o  administer technical 
ass is tance.  F i r s t ,  the United States may send technic ims  
1 Ibzd., mle tw  No. 42, May 16, 1960, p.  780. 
*mpp., *. 24. 333ulletm No. 42, May 16, 1960, &. m. 
4porter Hardy "A Congressman ' s View of Technical Coopera- 
t ion ,"  h-, C&CIO(III (May, 1 9 5 9 ,  18- 
abroad t o  teach c i t izens  Of another country more advanced 
technology. Secondly, the United States may bear the expense 
of having c i t i z e n s  of other countries come t o  the m i t e d  
S t a t e s  f o r  technical  training in  colleges and nnivers i t ies .  
Thirdly, the United States may contribute t o  the support 
of spec ia l  jo in t  h r e a u s  Set U p  within the host government 
t o  ca r ry  out technical assistance programs. Basically, 
t echnica l  ass is tance i s  a program of edncation. 
Technical a id  has been of modest proportions in com- r 
parison t o  economic assistance. In 1959, United States  
r 
t echnica l  ass is tance amounted t o  only 4 per cent of the Mutual 
Securi ty  ~ ro~ra rn . '  United States technical assistance in India 
has a l s o  been of modest proportions. For example, the f i r s t  
technical  ass is tance agreement signed with India called f o r  an 
expenditure of only $1,200,000 and the edncation of 150 Indian 
2 technicians i n  the United States. By March of 1958, of the 
t o t a l  aid t o  India from the United States,  only $57 million,  
o r  5 p e r  cent ,  was for  teChnical assistance. 3 
Tppical of the United States - Indian technical coop- 
e r a t i o n  1s the Indian community development program. Started 
i n  October of 1952, it consists of f i f ty-f ive projects  fo r  
improving agr icu l tura l  methods, e m p l o ~ e n t ,  housing, heal th ,  
education, and a l l i e d  a c t i ~ i t i e s  17,500 vi l lages*  
A & & c  1 v q w  A V A ~ _ R  r L I I ~ U ~  ) ""l. .---- - -, -, - - , c -  - 
33&3., March 5 ,  1958, pa 5.  
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primary aim of t h i s  project i s  t o  increase food production 
from 30 per cent  t o  50 per cent. The or iginal  project  was 
a t  a cos t  of $80 million of which the United States paid 
$8,600,000. Pr ivate  United States agencies a l so  gave 
$230,000 f o r  the same project. 1 
Conslderlng the small amounts spent on technical aid 
t o  India,  the  r e s u l t s  have been encouraging. Assisted a l so  
by t h e  United Nations, India has been successful in such areas 
as reducing the incidence of malaria and decreasing infant  
f a t a l i t i e s .  2 
111. PRIVATE ASSISTANCE 
A type of development assistance unused by the Soviet 
Bloc i s  p r iva te  assistance. Although the r o l e  of such pr i -  
vote group8 a s  the Ford Foundation and the American Friends 
Sa r r i ce  Conrnittee has been small in  comparison t o  United 
S t a t e s  Government assistance, their contributions t o  the 
devalopment of India have been significant.  For example, 
during the Indian famine of 1951 private United States  
sources sent  18750,600 in re l i e f  supplies t o  India. 3 
Tha pr iva te  agencies have maintained t h e i r  own planning 
in aiding India and have been successful i n  t h e i r  own r ight .  
1 Jbid., September 20, 1952, Pe 220 
'The United States  pays approximately 40 per cent of 
United Nations expenditures. 
3 ~ n l t c d  Sta tes  Department of State ,  h l l e t l n  No. 47 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, August 4, 1952), 
p. 182. 
For example, i n  1958 the Ford Foundation branched in to  
another area of the Indian economy by granting $2,200,000 
t o  promote small industries. ALSO 1958, the F-dation 
granted $750,000 t o  India t o  help her plan more r e a l i s t i c  
fu ture  f ive  Year plans through the assistance of Massa- 
chuse t t s  I n s t i t u t e  of Technology experts. 1 
IV* PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
Where India had hoped for  greatest  success i n  financ- 
ing her  economic development, private investment, the r e s u l t s  
have been disappointing. The Reserve Bank of India reported 
In 1955 t h a t  the United States had furnished only 7 per cent 
of the c a p i t a l  investment i n  1ndiae2 By December of 1959, 
United S ta te s  pr ivate  investment in India amounted t o  only 
about $120,000 ,OW. 
There hava been several problems in regard t o  incrcas- 
ing United S ta te s  private investment i n  India. The basic 
problem i s  t h a t  India fears  exploitation, while United Sta tes  
inves tors  fear nationalization of the i r  investments. A t  the 
present  tha investment opportunities in the United s t a t e s  so 
antweigh those i n  India tha t  there is  l i t t l e  likelfiood of 
any m b s t a n t i a l  increase in investments i n  that country- 
man  United States private capi ta l  has been invested 
lThe New York T i m ,  August 189 1958, P- 17- 
*I~ I~ I . ,  Septernbr 12, 1955, P-  33- 
31biq., Dsccnbar 8, 1959, P a  19- 
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i n  India i n  la rge  sums, it has usually been accompanied by 
spec ia l  agreements which serve t o  minimize the fears  men- 
tioned heretofore. For example, the Standard-Vacum Company 
b u i l t  three o i l  re f iner ies  i n  India from 1951 t o  1954. Ihe 
agreement between t h a t  company and the Indian Government 
ca l l ed  f o r  no nationalization of these re f iner ies  for  a t  
l e a s t  twenty-five years, and gave Standard-Vacuum concessions 
on such things a s  customs duties. 1 
In the l a t t e r  months of 1959 the Indian and United ?. 
S t a t e s  governments took steps t o  encourage private invest- 
ment i n  India. F i r s t ,  India agreed t o  give Income from 
pr iva te  investment a special  tax exemption. Then these two 
countr ies  signed a t rea ty  whereby the money earned by United 
S t a t e s  Investors  as a resu l t  of the Indian tax exemption w i l l  
be t rea ted  a s  t a x  f r ee  income i n  the United states.* The 
l a t e s t  agreement by India and the United States  guarantees 
an investor  t h a t  i f  h i s  business i s  expropriated or nation- 
a l i zed ,  he w i l l  be able t o  recover h i s  los s  i n  dol lars .  The 
Unitad S ta ta s  w i l l  be the guarantor and all charge the 
b v s s t o r  a fee f o r  the insurance. 3 
V. INDIAN - AMERICAN RELATIONS 
The t e s t  of an aid program i n  which the emphasis i s  
- - 
1 Ibis., December 1, 1951, P. 1. 
2 I . ,  November 11, 1950, P- 3. 
I . ,  December e ,  1950, P- 19. 
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on s e c u r i t y  i s  how closely the recipient  securi ty p o l i c i e j  
follow those of the donor. If such e t e s t  were applied t o  
Indian - hler ican  economic aid re la t ions ,  the United States  
Program has been a fa i lure .  me fac t  tha t  India has con- 
s t a n t l y  stood against  United States mili tary a l l iances  gives 
testimony t o  t h a t  fac t .  the other hand, if a l l  the United 
S t a t e s  expected i n  her aid program to  India was t o  maintain 
the  i n t e g r i t y  of ind ia ' s  neutral i ty,  the United Sta tes  aid 
program has  been a success. - 
One s t e rn  lesson which the United States  has learned 
- 
In India  i s  t h a t  she can not "buyn India. The waxing and 
waning of f r i end ly  Indian - American re la t ions  has not 
coincided wlth the amount of aid which the United Sta tes  has 
given t o  India, but has depended almost en t i r e ly  on p o l i t i c a l  
events completely separated from aid. 
Ind ia ' s  neu t ra l i ty  has been based predominantly on two 
f a c t o r s  which have been hard t o  understand by Americans. One 
of these f ac to r s  i s  geographical. As one author s ta ted:  
mIrnagine t h a t  Canada was Russia, tha t  Mexico was Red China, 
and t h a t  we were India. Then, consider ~ n d i a ' s  foreign 
policy. w1 The other factor  is  re la t ive  strength- In under- 
standing t h i s  factor  of the Indian position of neut ra l i t?  one 
need remember just one thing: the  united States  has t he  
power t o  r e s i s t  force; India does 
1 Thomas Morgan w. find Fellow Studantp (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1~46 , p .  
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'Jkee places where India and the United States  have 
disagreed are:  (1) the a t t i tude  towards the expansion of 
communism, (2) the colonialism of European nations, and 
(3) Red China. India does not regard communism as  the 
t h r e a t  which the  United States does. In colonial matters, 
India has resented the indecisive a t t i tude  of the United 
States .  The bas is  of the problem of Red China i s  t h a t  India 
bel ieves  t h a t  the Chinese Communists should represent the 
Chinese people in the United Nations, while the United Sta tes  
s t i l l  c l ings  t o  the Taiwan Government. 
Tha posl t fve side of Indian - American re la t ions  has 
been the r e s u l t  of the continued United States aid and Com- 
munist blunders such a s  the suppression of the Fhmgarian 
r e v o l t  by the Union of Soviet Social is t  Republics (U.S.S.R.), 
and t h e  border dispute wlth Red China. As can be seen, the 
removal of Unitad States  aid to  India would make Indian - 
American r e l a t i o n s  largely dependent on Communist moves, 
CHAPTER VI 
SOVIET A I D  
Frustra ted i n  t h e i r  reliance upon force and d i rec t  
subversion t o  expand the i r  influence over other countries, 
Soviet  leaders  began t o  place new emphasis on the economic 
approach i n  the l a t t e r  months of 1953. Until t ha t  time the 
Soviet  pol icy i n  'regard t o  aiding the underdeveloped cotm- 
t r i e s  had been t o  c r i t i c i z e  the United States  aid program 
and t o  accuse the  United States of trying t o  dominate other 
countries.  
I. MOTIVES 
J u s t  a s  the United States '  prime motivation i n  aiding 
underdeveloped countries i s  deterring the expansion of com- 
munism, so Russia's motivation i s  primarily the expansion of 
the  geographical area of colmmnism. The specif ic  goals of 
Russia i n  eiding such undsrdevelaped countries as India seem 
t o  bet (1) the  gaining of influence and good w i l l  in these 
countr ies ,  (2)  encouraging positive neutralism, (3)  lessening 
Western influence, (4) promoting free  world tensions, and 
( 5 )  undermining f ree  world alliances. 1 
1 United States  Department of State,  Communi 
Three$ (Washington: Government Printing Cffice,  1950 , 
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The economic motivation behind Russia's aid program, 
although s l i g h t  i n  comparison with her po l i t i ca l  aspira- 
t i o n s ,  i s  nevertheless significant.  The re su l t  of Russia's 
increased economic motivation has been the advocacy of more 
t rad ing  by other countries with  her. This trade is advan- 
tageous t o  Russia in tha t  it helps to  feed her growing popula- 
t i o n  and a l s o  supplies her growing industry with needed 
mater ia ls .  The f a c t  t h a t  Soviet aid i s  not without economic 
concern seems t o  be proven by such agreements as  the one she 
has with India in which the Soviet c red i t  arrangement pegs 
the  rupee t o  gold. 1 
There i s  a l so  evidence of the use of Soviet psychology 
in her  a id  program. For example, in  India Soviet a id  has 
emphasized industry,  which i s  long las t ing,  imposlng and 
tangible.  This i s  i n  contrast  t o  the United States '  prograa 
which emphasizes foodstuffs and raw materials, which quickly 
l o s e  t h e i r  ident i ty .  Certainly good health and improved 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  techniques are not as  tangible as  s t ee l .  
Whatever the  other motivations might be, there is 
l i t t l e  doubt t h a t  Ftussia's prime motivation I s  po l i t i ca l .  
Niklta Rhrnshchev once said,  "We value trade l e a s t  fo r  eco- 
nomic reasons and most fo r  po l i t i ca l  purposes. n2 The 
l ~ i c h a c l  Sapir, The Mew Role d &I?&!S. &l 
Wor1.4 F+~J (New York: The Comittee f o r  Fcononic Develop- 
ment, 1"-' ,, p m  15. 
2 United Sta tes  Department of State ,  C o m i s t  
Fconomic ThreaG, m. &., p. 2. 
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c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of Soviet economic transactions with under- 
developed countries suggests that  these are not s t ra ight  
business agreements. m e  length of payment, the in te res t  
charges, and quant i t ies  and types of goods suggest tha t  the  
motivations a r e  not en t i r e ly  economic. 
The p o l i t i c a l  motivation also seems t o  be confirmed 
by the  geographical character of Soviet investments, which 
have emphasized trouble spots such as Syria, India, Burma, 
and Egypt. .. 
Why then, i f  Russia's motives seem so evident, do the 
underdeveloped countries continue to  accept S w i e t  aid? Some 
reasons are:  (1) the f a c t  tha t  Russia i s  pa r t i a l ly  Asian 
which provides a community factor,  (2) Russia's anti-colonial 
history, (3) the f a c t  t h a t  Russia has no merchants who have 
been objects  of contempt I n  the underdeveloped countries, 
(4) R u s s l e ' s  model of quick development, and (5) the form of 
Fussian aid  which is characterized by quick action, low in ter -  
e s t  r a t e s ,  long repayment periods, no s t r i n g s  attached, and 
buying what the underdeveloped countries wish t o  se l l .  
1 
There i s  considerable evidence tha t  the underdeveloped 
countries believe such speeches as the one given by the 
Russian delegate t o  the Afro-Asian Peoples Sol idar i ty  Conference 
i n  Cairo when ha s a id ,  
We do not  seek t o  get any advantages. . . We 
are ready t o  help yon as  brother helps brother, 
' ~ o s e ~ h  Berliner So e t  Economic Aid (New York: 
Fredrick A. Praeger, 1 ~ 5 8 f k 6 .  
without any In te res t  whatever, for we know from our 
o m  experience how d i f f i c u l t  it i s  t o  get  r i d  of 
need .I 
11. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOVIET 
ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE 
Since the  opening of the Soviet economic offensive 
In 1953, programs developed by that  country have Involved 
th ree  d i f f e r e n t  kinds of economic transactions. F i r s t ,  the 
Soviets  emphasized increased trade, and then offered economic 
and technica l  assistance t o  such underdeveloped countries as  
India. 
Trade. Russian trade with India has never been of any 
g r e a t  s ignif icance.  For the three years preceding the Soviet 
economic offensive the trade between India and Rnssia 
amounted t o  only about 1 per cent of India's t o t a l  trade with 
o ther  countrlea. 2 
Russian attempts t o  trade with India were a t  f i r s t  
unsuccessf'ul, but as  the needs of India's F i r s t  Five Year 
Plan became evident, end the Soviet offers became more a t t rac-  
t i v e ,  these two countries signed a five year b i l a t e r a l  trade 
agreement i n  December of 1953. 3 
'united S ta te s  Department of State,  ~~. No. 38 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, May 5 ,  10551, 
P. 733. 
2 The New m, January 19, 1052, pa 28. 
3 ~ . 9  January 5, lo%, p m  47. 
Wt 
TABLE 111 
COMPARATIVE DEPEMXNCE OF INDIA ON TRADE WITH THE 
SOVIET BLOC AND THE UMITED STATES, lq56* 
Per Cent of Exports 
Soviet  Bloc United States Leading Nation 
3.8 per cent  15 per cent 31.1 per cent 
(United Kingdom ) 
Per Cent of Imports 
Soviet  Bloc United States Leading Nation 
4.5 per cent  11.2 per cent 26.3 per cent 
(United Kingdom ) 
*Source: Michael Sapir, The New Role of the Soviets 
a tJg World Economy (New York: Committee for  Economic 
Development, April, 19581, p. 13. 
Although Soviet trade gains have not reached any great  
proportions, her  e f fo r t s  in that  direction have not been with- 
m t  success. Russia had forty-nine trade agreements with 
var ious countries i n  1953. A t  the end of 1957 she had 145 
mch agreements with twenty-eight countries, and by 1959 she 
had 173 t rade agreements with thirty-one countriesm1 Trade 
with the  underdeveloped countries has t r ipled since 1954, 
r i s i n g  from a t o t a l  of $800 million s t  tha t  t h e  t o  over 12 
b i l l i o n  i n  1958. 2 
' ~ n l t c d  States  Depsrtmnt of State ,  w e t 4  No. 40 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, February 9, 1960), 
p .  207. 
2nid., WJB no. 42, Map 2, 1060, P. 680. 
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L0allSa While the United States aid program has 
emphasized both loans and grants, the Russian program has 
r e l i e d  almost en t i r e ly  On loans. Ihe Soviet loans have had 
two p a r t i c u l a r l y  a t t r ac t ive  features t o  such countries as  
India ,  low i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and par t i a l  repayment in  goods. 
The t yp ica l  In te res t  r a t e  for a Soviet loan has been 
2 t o  23 per cent.  In comparison, the International Bank f o r  
Reconstruction and Development and the Export - Import Bank 
charge i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  varying from 43 per cent t o  6 per cent. 
The other a t t r a c t i v e  feature of Soviet loans i s  the 
f a c t  t h a t  they can be repaid par t ia l ly ,  or possibly f u l l y ,  
in goods r a t h e r  than i n  convertible currency.' The united 
S t a t e s  has never accepted goods in repayment. 
Technical assistance. Soviet technical assistance t o  
underdeveloped countries has been increasing, par t icu lar ly  in 
t h e  p a s t  two  years. For example, in the l a s t  six munths of 
1958 there  were four thousand Soviet technicians in seventeen 
countries.  This was an increase of 1,200 i n  the space of one 
year and compares with a t o t a l  of 4,600 United States  tech- 
n i c i a n s  i n  the same ares.* The t o t a l  number of Soviet tech- 
nlciana i n  underdeveloped countries is  now about f ive  thmsand; 
2 ~ n i t c d  Sta tes  Department of State ,  u s t b  NO. 40 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, February 9, 19601, 
p. 207. 
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while four thousand technicians from these countries have 
been t ra ined  i n  Russia in  the past four years. 1 
Typical of how Soviet technical assistance works i n  
India i s  the Soviet financed s t e e l  m i l l  a t  Bhalai, India. 
Under t h i s  agreement India wi l l  send seven hmdred workers, 
engineers,  and technicians t o  Russia for  training. Rnssia 
w i l l  i n  tu rn  keep several hundred technicians a t  the Bhalai 
m i l l  f o r  a period of twelve years. 2 
Soviet pro3ects ,in India. The Russian financing of 
the  s t e e l  m i l l  a t  Bhalai, India, was the f i r s t  large d i r e c t  
investment by Russia in  the industrial  economy of India. 
This p ro jec t  was s ta r ted  In 1955 and called for  a Soviet 
c r e d i t  of $115 million. Also, seven hundred Indian techni- 
c ians  were trained i n  Russia under t h i s  agreement. 3 
In lPovernber of 1956 the Soviets extended a c red i t  of 
$126 mill ion t o  India for  a heavy machlne building plant ,  a 
p l an t  f o r  manufacturing of coal mining machinery, an opt ica l  
glass fac tory ,  and a 250,000 k i lowa t t  capacity thermal power 
s t e t i o n .  Thase projects started i n  1953, and are t o  be 
repaid a t  2 1  per cent in t e res t  in  twelve annual installments 
of 9126,000,OOO. These projects a lso c a l l  f o r  the t ra ining 
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of Indian technicians in Russia. 1 
Although the above two agreements are by f a r  the 
l a r g e s t  between India and Russia, there have been many 
smaller p ro jec t s  undertaken i n  India through Soviet credits .  
Some examples are:  (1) In June of 1956 Russia shipped twenty 
coal  mining r i g s  valued a t  $450,000 t o  India; (2 )  Later In 
1956 Russia delivered t o  India a $3,600,000 o i l  d r i l l i n g  r i g ;  
(3) Russia i s  now furnishing laboratory equipment and techni- 
c a l  personnel a s  professors and translators f o r  a technical 
i n s t i t u t e  a t  Bombay; and (4) the Soviets have supplied over 
s i x  hundred items of agr icul tural  equipment t o  develop a 
th ree  thousand acre mechanized farm near Rajasthan. 2 
Indicat ive of what the future holds f o r  Indian - Soviet 
economic relations i s  the Indian acceptance of a Soviet ruble 
c r e d i t  of S~~~ ,OCO,OOO to help finance India 's  Third Five Year 
Plan which s t a r t s  i n  1961. 3 
111. SOVIFT - INDIAN RELATIONS 
Unti l  1953 Soviet t a c t i c s  i n  regard t o  United States  
a id  amounted t o  denouncing the United States a s  trying t o  
dominate India. India repeatedly protested such public 
c r i t i c i s m  of the United States  aid program. Thus, Indian - 
Soviet  r e l a t i o n s  were not considered amicable for  that period. 
1 The New York Times, November 10, 1957, p. 12. 
"1bld. , January 15, 1958, P o  4* 
31bid., July 30, 19599 Pm 5. 
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In 1953 Russia's a t t i tude  changed from outside 
c r i t i c i s m  t o  d i r e c t  part icipation in Indian economic develop- 
ment. As contacts  between these two countries increased, so 
did the closeness of t h e i r  relations. There are  several 
reasons f o r  t h i s ,  the predominant one being a mutual desire  
by India and Russia t o  decrease Western influence in Asia. 
Also, India looked upon Russia favorably because of the 
impression Russia had made of a simple people pulling them- 
se lves  up by the bootstraps with l i t t l e  foreign assistance, 
and a l s o  the ident i f ica t ion  of the Russian Revolution wi th  
a n t i - ~ o l o n i a l i s r n . ~  In 1955, Russia and India signed Nehru ' s 
Five Pr inc ip les ,  which called for t e r r i t o r i a l  in tegr i ty  and 
respec t  of sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference i n  
2 
i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s ,  mutual benefits, and peaceful coexistence. 
The Russian suppression of Hungary marked a changed 
Indian a t t i t u d e  towards Rnssia. Although becoming more sus- 
p l c l m s  of Russian motives, India contirmed, for  economic 
reasons, t o  be i n  close contact r i t h  Russia on f inancial  
matters.  On February 17, 1960, a j o h t  carmmvlique by India 
and Russia announced t h a t  re la t ions  between the two countries 
were a t  an a l l  time high. 3 
'~owles ,  Ambassador's R ~ D o F ~ ,  a*, p. 216. 
'~avahara la l  Achm "Indian - Soviet Relations,' V i t a  
S~ecchep,  XXI (June 21, 1 4 5 ~ ) ~  1356. 
'The --- New York Tfmea, February 17, 1960, P a  1- 
CHAPTER V I I  
SUMMARY, SUGGESTIONS AND COMCLUSIONS 
There i s  a great  need for  improvement i n  the admin- 
i s t e r i n g  of United Sta tes  aid t o  India. This  f i n a l  chapter 
w i l l  o f fe r  a summary on the problem examined i n  t h i s  thes is ,  
and suggestions and conclusions on how the United States  aid 
program can be made more effective in India. 
I* SUMMARY 
Since 1953 the United States and Russia have engaged 
i n  a i d  competition i n  India. This thesis  examined the re la-  
t ionsh ip  of India, Rnssia, and the United States t o  each 
o the r  a s  each scmght an objective in aiding the Indian eco- 
nomy. India 's  purpose i n  developing her economy, as was shown, 
i s  t o  improve the l iv ing  standards of her huge population, 
while maintaining a policy of neutral i ty  in the "cold war," 
Russia 's  main purpose in aiding the development of the India 
economy hea been t o  spread communism, with a lso a few eco- 
nomic motivations of a l e s se r  natnre. The United States  has 
been motivated t o  aid India fo r  two reasons. First, the United 
S t a t a s  believes t h i s  i s  an active way t o  stop the spread of 
comnnullsrn, and secondly, the United States wishes t o  see a 
fe l low democratic country ra i se  i t s  standard of l iving.  
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!Jith the  above relationships between India, the United 
S t a t e s  and Russia i n  mind, t h i s  study sought ways through the 
comparison of United Sta tes  and S w i e t  aid to  India in which 
economic and p o l i t i c a l  cooperation between the United States  
and India  could be made more effective in stopping the spread 
of communism, while a l so  assist ing the development of the 
Indian economy. 
In  order t o  give the proper sett ing for the Soviet - 
American a id  s t ruggle  It was necessary t o  show a  few of India 's  
;I bas ic  economic problems since an effective aid program must 
have a d i r e c t  connection t o  these problems. Then, India 's  
e f f o r t s  t o  develop her economy through the F i r s t  Five Year 
Plan, and the Second Five Year Plan were examined. This 
served the purpose of showing that  United States aid t o  India 
i s  not  being wasted, tha t  the United States can coordinate a  
program f o r  the develdpnent of India with tha t  country, and 
t h a t  India i s  s t r l v l n g  t o  make her  economic s i tuat ion l a s s  
amenable t o  conmnulism. 
The adainis t ra t ion,  notives, and nature of United States  
aid waa then exavined fo r  the purpose of givlng a general back- 
ground t o  United States  efforts t o  thwart communism and t o  aid 
the  drvalopmcnt of underdeveloped countries. Then t h i s  exam- 
i na t ion  of the  United States aid program was applied t o  India 
a s  the  ver iaus  e f f o r t s  of the Unitad States  to aid  India were 
rrviewrd, and the  a c c e s s  of these e f for t s  in strengthening 
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United S t a t e s  - Indian r e l a t i ons  was scrutinized. 
The Soviet  aid program in India was examined f o r  three  
reasons:  (1 )  t o  show the  purposes for  which Russia a id s  
I n d i a ,  and the  t a c t i c s  she uses t o  fur ther  her motivations 
i n  t h a t  country, (2) t o  show the areas i n  which the Soviet 
a i d  t o  India  has  been e f f ec t ive  so t h a t  the  United S ta tes  can 
l e a r n  by i t s  mistakes, and (3) t o  show what e f f e c t  Russian 
a i d  t o  Lndia has  had i n  strengthening Soviet - Indian re la -  
t i o n s .  I 
With the  purposes and main body of t h i s  t h e s i s  stun- 
marlzed, t h e  suggest ions and conclusions based upon them 
fol low. 
11. THE ADMINISTFATION OF UNITED STA!lXS AID 
Increased to Indlc. The United S ta tes  should not  
on ly  continue t o  aid Ind ia ' s  development, but should increase 
i t s  f i n a n c i a l  support t o  India. Aid t o  India i s  of ten  c r i t -  
l ~ i z a d  a8 money wasted, and an excessive gamble since the 
United S t a t e s  has no assurance tha t  India w i l l  not become 
Communist. However, not  giving aid t o  India i s  a g rea te r  
gamble, and t h e  l a t t e r  gamble i s  one t h a t  the United S t a t e s  
cannot  af ford .  
Although United S t a t e s  aid t o  India i s  expensive, so 
i s  war. Tha Korean War cos t  fo r ty  times a s  much a s  aid t o  Pre- 
Communist China.' Today the West invests  $100 b i l l i o n  per year 
'!C& New Yor& Times, September 20, 1953, m, P- 9 .  
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i n  defense.  h e  per  c e n t  of t h a t  sum would increase t h e  
mechanizat ion of India  100 per cent.' Even the economy- 
minded can be comforted by the  f a c t  t h a t  75 per  cent  of 
United S t a t e s  a i d  funds a r e  spent i n  the United Sta tes .  2 
B e t t e r  coordinat ion.  A t  the present ,  the  United 
S t a t e s  admin i s t e r s  a id  t o  underdeveloped count r ies  such a s  
I n d i a  through s e v e r a l  agencies;  the In terna t ional  Coopera- 
t i o n  Adminis t ra t ion ,  the  Export-Import Bank, and the Develop- 
ment Loan F'und a r e  examples. Although cooperation among 
t h e s e  agenc ies  h a s  been good, i t  has been d i f f i c u l t  t o  keep 
from d u p l i c a t i n g  e f f o r t .  
The United S t a t e s  can p r o f i t  from the experiences of 
the United Nations i n  t h i s  respect.  The Technical Assis tance 
Board of the  United Nations has been very e f f e c t i v e  i n  coor- 
I 
d i n a t l n g  developaent  a s s i s t a n c e  through the various United 
Ra t ions  agencies .  A d u ~ l i c a t i o n  of the United Nations Tech- 
n i c a l  Ass i s t ance  Board by the  United S t a t e s  would increase  
the c o o r d i n a t i o n  of her a i d  programs. 
Concent ra t inq  aJ& in. India. In the  p a s t ,  the United 
S t a t e s  program has  been spread over such a l a r g e  a rea  t h a t  
Russ ia ,  by concent ra t ing  her  a id  i n  a few key coun t r i e s ,  has  
'united S t a t e s  Congress, Senate, Comaittee on Foreign 
R e l a t i o n s ,  Hearings,  !he :.!utuaL Securi ty  && of J-, 85th 
Connress , 2nd Session (Wasi~inqton: Governnent ~ r i n ~ l n g  
Ocfice,  p. 656. 
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been able  t o  make a substant ia l  impact. By concentrating aid 
i n  India,  the l a rges t  f ree  nation in the world, the United 
S t a t e s  would be making a showcase of the democratic methods 
of development, which might have a better  effect  than d i s -  
pers ion of a id  over great  areas. It i s  unfortunate t h a t  the 
United States does not have the means t o  a s s i s t  al.1 tmder- 
developed countries t o  the same degree, but the f ac t  remains 
t h a t  a democratic India i s  indispensable t o  the future of 
the  United States .  The United States must therefore con- 
c e n t r a t e  more aid i n  t h a t  country.' 
Xncreased continnltv. The fac t  tha t  the United States  
a id  program i s  dependent upon annual appropriations has been 
a constant  problem in the effective administration of aid. 
India 's f l v e  year development programs have been p a r t i a l l y  
dependent upon United States  assistance, and has thus been 
hampered i n  maMng plans for the future, when she has no 
aasuranca of the amount of United States aid. A s  f a r  back 
as 1995, before the Khmshchev-Fulganin v i s i t  t o  India, 
Indian leaders  intimated t h a t  they muld l i k e  t o  h o w  what 
they c m l d  expect from the United States before talking with 
the two h s s i a n  leaders. 2 
1 There has been evidence of such a concentration in 
r ecen t  months. On March 24, 1960, The New York 
reported t h s t  James P. Riddlaberger, head of the Interna- 
t i o n a l  Cooperation Administration, had announced a new 
policy of concentrating n i d  i n  Pakistan, Tatwen, and India. 
2 The New Y ~ r k  Times, November 17, 1955, p.  1. --
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It i s  not en t i r e ly  necessary that  the United States  
make a commitment t o  India of a certain specified sm for  
a s t a t ed  number of years. A mere declaration of intention 
such a s  the Marshall Plan would give the United States  aid 
program i n  India a continuity Which it now lacks. There 
seems t o  be no good reason why the h i t e d  States has not 
made such a declarat ion,  since it has obvioasly emphasized 
a i d  t o  India. 1 
I L o a n s  r a t h e r  than grants, Nehru has emphasized the 
f a c t  t ha t  India des i res  loans rather than grants.2 The Unlted 
S t a t e s  can help both herself  and India by f u l f i l l i n g  Nehru's 
wishes, 
Grants too often have the "rich nation gives dole t o  
poor nat ionw atigma. In a country with sensit ive national  
p r ide ,  such as  India, such a stigma i s  of g rea t  significance, 
On t h e  other  hand, loans a re  made by one businessman t o  
another, This i s  the posit ion which India wishes t o  assume, 
Emphasizing loans would  increase the amounts of aid 
which the United States  would be able to  give. As one loan 
was r e p a i d ,  the  United States  could re-loan the money ageln. 
Loana with anmal  payments maintain a connection 
betmen countr ies  which grants cannot a t ta in .  This lends a 
'The May 4, 1960, h b l i c  Law 4-80 agreement between the 
United S ta te s  and India which Is mentioned on page 2Q i s  
e n c o u r a ~ i n ~  in t ha t  it c a l l s  for the agreement t o  take place 
over a foul* year period. 
'The York Tlmes, 
- 
December 20, 
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c o n t i n u i t y  t o  the United S t a t e s  program which i s  badly 
needed. 
Loans have a ce r t a in  psychological advantage, i n  
t h a t  t hey  may be e f f e c t i v e  i n  creat ing favorable r e l a t i ons  
a number of times. For example, the rec ipient  i s  gra te fn l  
when t h e  loan  i s  received; he is  gra teful  again when the  
l o a n  i s  extended i f  he cannot make the payments, and so on. 
Encouranernent af pr iva t e  investment. The Dnited S t a t e s  
should encourage more p r iva t e  investment i n  India. India has  
r epea t ed ly  expressed a des i r e  f o r  United S ta tes  pr ivate  
investment,  bu t  a s  shown I n  Chapter V, i t  continues t o  be 
on ly  a small amount of the t o t a l  pr ivate  investment i n  India. 
Since the  Soviets  have nothing i n  the way of p r iva te  
inves tnen t ,  t he  United S t a t e s  faces l i t t l e  competition i n  
t h i s  a rea .  Therefore, any Increase i~ pr iva te  investment in 
I n d i a  would be a n e t  gain in the competition with the Soviets.  
Puss l a ' s  econonic s t rength  is i n  her government. 
United S t a t a s  economic s t rength  i s  i n  pr ivate  enterpr ise .  
Thus, t h e  l a t t e r  is  i n  competition i n  India whether it i s  
r e a l i z e d  o r  not .  The United S ta tes  should make i t s  business- 
men aware of what i s  a t  s take  i n  India, and encourage them t o  
Inc rease  t h e i r  investments i n  t ha t  country. 
1 
 or two encouraging agreements, S U D ~ B . ,  p. 37. 
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Sbeed f l e x i b i l i t v .  The United States aid pro- 
gram needs more speed and f l e x i b i l i t y .  As previously shown, 
India  Is development plans have an urgency, which the United 
S t a t e s  must match i n  speed of operation. India was much 
impressed by the  f a c t  t h a t  equipment f o r  the Russian financed 
farm near  Rajasthan arrived withln two months a f t e r  signing 
of t he  agreement.' On the other hand, Indian newspapers were 
c r i t i c a l  of the  slowness with which the Point Four Program 
was implemented. 2 
The United S ta t e s  could Improve the speed and f l ex i -  
b i l i t y  of i t s  a id  program if it would create  a reserve fund 
for t h a t  purpose. Waiting f o r  next year 's  appropriations i s  
n o t  a s u i t a b l e  solut ion t o  an underdeveloped country's urgent 
needs. 
The $manUa 
- t i v e  p s ~ e c t .  The United States must be 
more imaginative in i t s  a id  competition with Russia. 
Khrushchev has expressed a desire t o  compete with 
c a p i t a l i s t  countr ies ,  a., the Enited States.  The United 
S t a t e s  should propoae t h a t  t h i s  competition take place i n  
t h e  field of a i d  t o  underdeveloped countries. The proposal 
i t s e l f  would be of g m a t  pres t ige  value t o  the United S ta tes ;  
t he  underdeveloped countries would prosper; and Russia's 
economy would be t r u l y  tes ted.  The United S ta tes  would thus 
'The - YorR Timez, Merch 7, 1956, P- 6. 
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p r e s s  a twofold problem upon the Soviets,  f o r  she would have 
t o  maintain a id  t o  the Soviet Bloc t o  r e t a i n  i t s  so l idar i ty ,  
and would have t o  a id  underdeveloped countries outside of 
t h e  Sovie t  Bloc i n  order t o  e f fec t ive ly  compete with the 
United S t a t e s .  
Aid i n  the  form of cap i t a l  improvements has a l a s t i n g  
impression because of i d e n t i t y ,  replacement of par t s ,  e t  
c e t e r a ,  while foodstuffs  quickly disappear. Therefore, the 
United S t a t e s  should channel i t s  food aid a s  much a s  possible 
through an in t e rna t iona l  agency such a s  the United Nations, 
whi le  g iving the c a p i t a l  improvements d i rec t ly .  Such an 
a c t i o n  would have the advantages of both unsel f ish  motivation 
and t h e  securing of a l a s t i n g  impression. 
When competing w i t h  Russia in economic a id ,  the United 
S t a t e a  must do so  under her own careful ly  prepared plan, and 
n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  t r y  t o  match or  surpass S w i e t  aid. In other  
words, the  IJnited S t a t e s  should be on the  offensive a s  much 
as  p o ~ s i b l e ,  and no t  on the  defensive. 
111. L.ITED STATES ATTITUDES AND MOTrVES 
United S t a t e s  b t t i t ude .  If the United Sta tes  i s  t o  
adrnlnlater an e f f e c t i v e  aid program, it must be attuned t o  
t h e  dominant a sp i r a t i ons  of the rec ipient  country. Therefore, 
he r  a t t i t u d e  towards these aspi ra t ions  i s  very s ignif icant .  
The Congress Party,  which has been i n  power i n  India 
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s i n c e  her independence, announced the four cardinal tenets  
of h e r  fo re ign  pol icy  a s  f a r  back a s  1925. They are: (1) 
oppos i t ion  t o  imperialism and colonial  ru le ,  (2) mpport of 
s u b j e c t  peoples and oppressed races i n  t h e i r  aspi ra t ions  
f o r  freedom and equal i ty ,  ( 3 )  promotion of peace and abhor- 
rence  of war, and (4) avoidance of foreign entanglements, 1 
United S t a t e s  a id  po l i c i e s  i n  India must r e f l e c t  an a t t i t u d e  
based on a c a r e f u l  diagnosis  of the above pr inciples ;  for  
example, a r e spec t  f o r  Ind ia ' s  neutralism, and f o r  the 
cau t iousness  on her  p a r t  i n  dealing with the West, 
Ind ia  i s  not  pro-Communist, but i s  pro-Asia. The 
United S t a t e s  must r e a l i z e  t h a t ,  as  stopping the expansion 
of  communism promotes i t s  cause, so promoting Asia helps 
I n d i a ' s  cause. This d o e s  not  necessari ly make Ind ia ' s  i n t e r -  
e s t s  con t r a ry  t o  those of the  United S ta tes ,  nor does it make 
them the same. The United S t a t e s  must r ea l i ze  t h a t  a  c m t r y  
n o t  106 per  cen t  aligned with her  i s  not 100 per cent  pro- 
Soviet .  Russian and American i n t e r e s t s  a re  not  the only ones 
i n  the world; India has her own i n t e r e s t s  a s  well. 
The United S t a t e s  must not  be apathet ic  t o  Ind ia ' s  
p l a n s  f o r  development. Many American point four technicians 
a r e  immediately discouraged when they see the  t ask  of r a i s ing  
I n d i a ' s  s tandard of l i v ing  t o  t h a t  of the h i t e d  Sta tes .  
I nd i ans ,  however, do not measure t h e i r  present standard of 
l i v i n g  a g a i n s t  t h a t  of the  United S ta tes ,  but agains t  t h a t  
7 
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which they have previously experienced. Progress which would 
seem slow t o  Americans could seem rapid t o  the Indian people. 
Therefore the  United States  a t t i tude  must be constant in  
t h a t  respec t ,  and never one of discouragement, 
The United Sta tes  must implement po$itive a t t i tudes  
r a t h e r  than negative ones, In other words the United States 
a t t i t u d e  should be pro-peace, and not anti-Soviet. 
Motives. The United States aid program has been domi- 
nated by secur i ty  motives. The United States aid t o  India 
would be much more ef fec t ive  i f  i t  were based on a l o f t i e r ,  
more permanent, and more fundamental purpose than national 
secur i ty .  It seems t h a t  a more idea l i s t i ca l ly  innovated pro- 
gram would appeal t o  the Indian people. In India, where the 
voluntary giving of land under the Bhoodan Yugna movement had 
1 
reached 1,900,000 acres by 1955, it seems there i s  plenty of 
r o m  f o r  i d e a l i s t i c  notlvea. 
I V .  SHIFTS I 3  EMPHASIS 
The United Nations. In colaparison t o  the t o t a l  amount 
of a id  given t o  underdevelqed countries by the United States ,  
very l i t t l e  of t h a t  amount has been channeled through agencies 
of the United Nations. In the period from July 1, 1945 to 
June 30, 1958, the United States gave a t o t a l  of 371.5 b i l l i o n  
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i n  d i r e c t  a i d ,  while giving only 81.4 b i l l i o n  through the 
United Nations, 1 
Sovie t  - American competition i n  aiding underdeveloped 
c o u n t r i e s  has had inconclusive resu l t s .  On the other hand, 
the United S t a t e s  has f a r  outdistanced Russia in aid admin- 
i s t e r e d  through the  United Nations. Therefore, a s h i f t  of 
emphasis t o  t he  United Nations would s h i f t  a t t en t ion  t o  the 
a r e a  m e r e  the  United S t a t e s  i s  winning i n  i t s  competition 
wi th  Russia.  
Russia has not  been near ly  a s  ac t ive  in the United 
Nations development programs a s  the  United States.  For 
example, fo r  severa l  years  a f t e r  i t s  inception, Russia d i d  not  
c o n t r i b u t e  a s i n g l e  rub le  t o  the United Nations Expanded Pro- 
gram of Technical Assistance, or  t o  the United Nations Chi l -  
dren's Fund. The Soviets  rejected membership In such United 
Nations agenclea a s  t he  In ternat ional  Bank f o r  Reconstruction 
and Development, the In ternat ional  Monetary Pund, the Food 
and Agr i cu l tu ra l  Organization, the  Internat ional  Labor Organl- 
t a t i o n ,  and the United Rations Educational, Sc ien t i f i c ,  and 
C u l t u r a l  Organization. In 1949 Russia withdrew from the 
World Health Organization. Since 1953 Fhssia has rejoined some 
of t h e s e  agencies,  but the f a c t  remains t h a t  the  United S t a t e s  
has  been t he  main support fo r  the United Nations ass i s tance  
programs. 
1 United S t a t e s  R-, 86th Con€!*, Ist 
Sess. ,  1a59, CV, Par t  
In switching increased emphasis by the United S t a t e s  
t o  t he  United Nations i n  administering an a id  program, there  
seems t o  be no immediate poss ib i l i t y  of Russian subversion 
through the  United Nations agencies. In 1958, f o r  example, 
only 1.6 per cent  of the technical assistance experts  u t i -  
l i z e d  by the  United Nations were Soviet c i t i zens .  The United 
S t a t e s ,  the  United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands fur-  
nished 1,066 of the t o t a l  of 2,427 compared with only f o r t y  
~ u s s i a n s . '  Since it i s  up t o  the c m t r y  requesting a s s i s t -  
ance from the United IJations t o  choose i t s  sources of snch 
as s i s t ance ,  it i s  not possible fo r  Russia t o  force  her  way 
i n t o  these  programs. Also it i s  doubtful t h a t  snch countr ies  
as India ,  which have a Western her i tage  i n  technology, w i l l  
wish t o  switch t o  Soviet pract ices.  
A s h i f t  t o  the  United Nations would bare her motives 
a s  humanitarian, and not  self-centered. Nehrn once sa id ,  
nThe United Nations i s  based on a cons t i tu t ion  of a highly 
pr incipled character ,  i t s  aim i s  a peaceml cooperation of 
peoples. "* Surely Nehru would be l e s s  suspect of United 
S t a t e s  motives, if it were t o  administer a l a rger  port ion of 
i t s  a id  through the  United Nations. 
If the  United S ta tes  were t o  shift a la rger  port ion 
of i t s  aid program t o  the United Nations, i t  would become 
Inc Mew York Tlmes, October 23, 1959, p* 2- 
-- 
2h.ehru, V * t a  Speeches, XXI (July 15, 1955) 13577. 
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m u l t i l a t e r a l  i n  character ,  r a ther  t han  b i l a t e r a l .  Multi- 
l a t e r a l  a id  has many advantages over b i l a t e r a l  aid. Some 
examples a r e  : 
1. Other countr ies  would contr ibute with the United 
S ta tes .  The probable r e s u l t s  of such cooperation 
would be t o  Increase the amounts avai lable  t o  the  
underdeveloped countries,  while decreasing the  
expense t o  the  United States.  
2. Experts could be recrui ted  from a l l  over the world. 
The United S ta tes  by no means has the bes t  exper ts  
i n  a l l  f i e ld s .  In f a c t ,  the United S t a t e s  standard 
of l i v i n g  i s  so f a r  advanced over such countr ies  a s  
India ,  t h a t  many times United S t a t e s  experts  are  
f ru s t r a t ed  in t h e i r  attempts t o  a s s i s t  the under- 
developed countries.  On the  other hand, experts  
from Japan and Indonesia who share the  same problems 
a s  India are  many times able t o  produce pos i t ive  
r e s u l t s  in  the same s i tuat ion.  A case In point  i s  
the  s u ~ g e s t i o n  by an Indonesian expert t ha t  India 
double crop her  r i c e  paddies, u, r a i s e  f i s h  in 
the  water of the paddies while the  r i c e  i s  growing. 
Although t h i s  pract ice  dated back many years in 
Indonesia, it was unknown t o  e i t h e r  Indians or 
Americans. 
3. The United Nations Trograes a re  nuch b e t t e r  i sola ted  
from p o l i t i c a l  manipulation than e i t he r  the Onited 
S t a t e s  or  Russian programs. Thus the needs of 
the  rec ip ien t  can be given grea te r  preference 
over the  motives of the  donor. 
4. The pres t ige  of the rec ipient  i s  l e s s  involved. 
India,  f o r  example, may be receiving ass is tance  
from the  United Nations, but a t  the same time, so  
w i l l  many other nations. 
5. The United Nations programs give rec ip ien t s  a  fee l ing 
of par t ic ipat ion.  For example, India would no t  
only receive assistance,  but would be expected t o  
contr ibute  experts  and money t o  the  program also.  
The fee l ing  of par t ic ipat ion helps the  under- 
developed country t o  preserve i t s  se l f  esteem, so  
v i t a l  t o  the developaent of a  country. 
6. h l t i l a t e r a l  aid can be e f fec t ive  i n  contributing t o  
peace. Presently the United Sta tes ,  the  United 
Kingdom, Austral ia ,  Canada, West Germany, and Hew 
Zealand are  contributing t o  the Internat ional  Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development a  sum of near ly  
one b i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  t o  finance the development of 
the  Indus River Basis. Water t roubles which have 
continually caused conf l ic t  between India and 
Pakistan now w i l l  be concluded s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  f o r  
both countries.  
7. Mul t i l a t e r a l  aid a s  u t i l i z ed  by the United Nations i s  
e f fec t ive  and well coordinated. The following 
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example r e f l ec t s  t h i s  fac t .  Malaria has been a 
continual  health problem i n  India. In 1950, India 
requested assistance from the United Nations t o  
help  i n  a l lev ia t ing  t h i s  problem. During the period 
of 1950 to 1952, blueprints were drawn by the World 
Health Organization for  dichlorodlphenyltrlchloro- 
ethane (D.D.T.) and pen ic i l l in  p lants  i n  India. 
Meanwhile, t he  United Nations International  Chil- 
d ren ' s  Emergency Fund provided one mil l ion dollars 
worth of equipment. In 1953, the United Nations 
Technical Assistance Administration took responsi- 
b i l i t y  f o r  the technical assistance f o r  I n d i a ' s  
malaria control.  Experts from England, Canada, 
Belgium, France, and I t a l y  were then sent  t o  India 
t o  study the problem and t o  help build plants  
needed t o  supply required chemicals. The D.D.T. 
and penicillin plant8 were  opened in 1956. These 
f ac to r i e s  now produce three thousand tons per Year 
and supply nearly a l l  of India 's  needs for these 
products, a t  a cost  25 per cent  less than present 
import costs. 
There has been a trend i n  the past few months by the 
united S t a t e s  i n  putt ing more emphasis on mul t i la tera l  type 
aid.  For example, the United Sta tes  and sixty-seven other 
na t ions  of the  International  Bank fo r  Reconstmction and 
Developmant and the International  Monetary Fund have recently 
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approved the  establishment of a new lending agency, the 
In t e rna t iona l  Development Authority. This new agency w i l l  
have a c a p i t a l  of one b i l l i o n  do l l a r s  t o  s t a r t ,  with the 
United S t a t e s  contr ibuting $300 million of t h a t  amount over 
the  nex t  f i v e  years. 1 
Mi l i t a ry  u. The emphasis of the United Sta tes  a id  
program i s  s t i l l  mired in  the Korean War s i t ua t ion  which 
2 
emphasized mi l i t a ry  needs. Soviet s t ra tegy and t a c t i c s  
have now sh i f t ed  away fron mil i tary  competition t o  economic 
conpet i t ion.  Therefore, the United Sta tes  i s  f ight ing a foe  
not  p re sen t  with more aid than the one tha t  i s  present. Aid 
i s  an a c t i v e  fo rce  against  communism, while mi l i t a ry  power i s  
only a defense. 
India  is a s  v i t a l  a battleground a s  Korea. Korea 
t e s t ed  Communist mi l i t a ry  intervention, while India i s  a 
t e s t  of Soviet  economic Intervention. The United S ta tes  must 
f i g h t  with d o l l a r s ,  which a r e  a small pr ice  i n  any terms of 
value a s  compared with human l ives .  This i s  the type of com- 
p e t i t i o n  which the United Sta tes  should prefer  and one I n  
which she can not afford t o  lose. 
~ b d ,  Cctobcr 1, 1959, p w  10. 
2 ~ h e  Pres ident ' s  Mutual Security Fudget f o r  f i s c a l  
year 1961 c a l l s  f o r  almost 75 per cent t o  be spent fo r  n i l i -  
t a r y  purposes. United States  Department of Sta te ,  h l l e t i n  
No. 42 (Washington: Government Print ing O f f  i c e ,  March 28, 
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a. Technical assistance helps others 
t o  help themselves. Ultimately India w i l l  have t o  be self-  
r e l i a n t .  Therefore, the United States must emphasize the 
education of modern technology i n  India. 
There i s  no doubt of the need in  India of technical 
ass is tance.  An Indian farmer, for example, produces only 
one-half a s  much wheat per acre as the American farmer and 
only one-f i f th  a s  much cotton. 1 
The Indian people wish t o  produce t h e i r  own needs i n  
wheat, cotton, e t  cetera,  and not have to  r e ly  on foreign 
shipments. A t  the present, Indian farmers1 methods are  so 
antiquated t h a t  there i s  room for  immediate progress through 
teaching them more modern methods. A s  they learn these 
methods, modern machinery w i l l  be of more assistance t o  
them. The change from these ancient methods t o  modern 
machines 3eems t o  be too great  without an intervening tech- 
n i c a l  education process. 
V. INDIAN - AMERICAN RELATIONS 
a determinant. Pol i t ica l  factors  have been the 
main determinant of the amicability of Indian - American rela-  
t ions ,  not a i d .  Unfortunately, i t  has usually been negative 
act ions  by Communist countries rather than positive actions 
by the  United States  which have improved Indlan - American 
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r e l a t i o n s .  Examples are :  the suppression of the HimgarIan 
r e v o l t  by k s s i a ,  and China's menacing t a c t i c s  on the Indian 
border. On the  d e f i c i t  s ide have been the United Sta tes  
m i l i t a r y  ass i s tance  t o  Pakistan, the landing of United 
S t a t e s  t roops  i n  Lebanon, the r a c i a l  s i tua t ion  i n  the United 
S t a t e s ,  and the indifference t o  European colonialism as shown 
by the  United S ta tes .  Therefore, i f  the United S ta tes  aid 
program i s  t o  be e f fec t ive  i n  India, the United S ta tes  must 
take i n t o  account f a c t o r s  other than economic ones. 
Indian sus~lc iousness .  The United Sta tes  must make 
an accura te  diagnosis  of Indian feel ings.  
India has  been re luc tan t  t o  ask f o r  aid from the United 
S t a t e s .  Almost always, i t  has been the United S ta tes  who 
i n i t i a t e d  the negotiat ions which have led t o  aid agreements 
with India.  India recognizes i t s  needs, but a l so  wlshes t o  
maintain Its nat ional  in tegr i ty .  The United Sta tes  must under- 
stand t h a t  f a c t ,  i f  it is t o  aid India ef fect ively .  
India  has continually been suspicious of United S t a t e s  
motives i n  aiding her. HOW well India remembers t h a t  it was 
the  establishment of a  few harmless trading posts by the  
B r l t i s h  East  India Company tha t  led t o  years of Br i t i sh  domina- 
t i on .  With such a long h i s to ry  of being dominated by a  foreign 
country, t he  United S t a t e s  should understand India ' s  fee l ings  
i n  t h a t  respect .  Fortunately, time has proven tha t  the United 
S t a t e s  does no t  wish t o  dominate India, and India i s  thus grow- 
ing l e s s  suspicious. 
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lndie Pekistan. Unfortunately the United S ta tes  
ha5 been i n  t h e  middle of the constant conf l i c t  between India 
and Pakistan.  m e  United S ta tes  has given both mi l i t a ry  and 
economic a i d  t o  Pakistan, while India,  by its request ,  
r ece ives  only economic assistance. The r e s u l t  has been t h a t  
the  United S t a t e s  has been, i n  e f f ec t ,  arming both countries 
aga ins t  each other .  For example, the United S ta tes  gives 
m i l i t a r y  a i d  t o  Pakistan. India in te rpre t s  t h i s  a s  an 
increased t h r e a t ,  and thus devotes more of i t s  budget t o  
defense. This Ind ia  i s  able t o  do p a r t i a l l y  because of United 
S t a t e s  economic assistance.  Thus, both India and Pakistan 
have been a t  odds with the United Sta tes  from time t o  time. 
One th ing i s  ce r ta in ;  the United S ta tes  can not afford 
t o  choose between India and Pakistan, f o r  she does not wish t o  
l o se  e i t h e r  a fr?end or  an a l l y .  Neither Pakistan, nor India 
has a r i g h t  t o  complain of economic aid  being given t o  the 
other .  The problem l i e s  i n  the United S ta tes  mi l i t a ry  aid t o  
P a u s t a n .  merefore ,  the United S ta tes  should channel t h i s  
a i d  through the  regional  defense a l l i ance  of which the United 
S t a t e s  and Pakistan a r e  both members, the South East As ia  
Treaty Organization. 
VI. SOVIFT A I D  
Disadventaneq. The United S ta tes  must r ea l i ze  that 
In competing with Russia i n  economic  id, Russia has many 
d i s t i n c t  advantages. 
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I h e  United S ta tes  can not hope t o  match the quick- 
ness of ac t ion  of a d ic ta to rsh ip ,  the machinery of democ- 
racy i s  j u s t  t o0  slow. Also, Russia has consumptive 
markets with which it can grea t ly  increase trade. The 
uni ted '  S t a t e s  i s  a t  a disadvantage once again, since foreign 
t r ade  p lays  such a small p a r t  i n  i ts  economy. Furthermore, 
if Russia ' s  aid t o  India f a i l s ,  India s t i l l  has the  a l t e r -  
na t ive  of communism, while i f  India f a i l s  t o  improve i t s  
economy through democratic means there is no a l t e rna t ive  f o r  
t h e  United States.  If the United Sta tes  is  t o  maintain a 
r e a l i s t i c  a id  program, it must keep these inherent disadvan- 
tages i n  mlnd, and do everything possible t o  minimize them. 
United S t a t e s  interference. The United S ta tes  need 
not interfere with Russian aid t o  India. 
In t he  long run i t  would seem t o  Russia 's advantage t o  
see Ind ia ' s  economy collapse. Therefore, the United S ta tes  
need not  i n t e r f e r e  with Russian a id  t o  India,  f o r  e i t h e r  I I 
Russia wil l  help India ' s  development, or  w i l l  back out and 
thus  lose pres t ige .  O f  courae, there is the poss ib i l i t y  
t h a t  Russian aid might become such an in t eg ra l  par t  of the 
Indlan economy t h a t  the t h rea t  of withdrawal would be a potent 
weapon. However, there seems t o  be very l i t t l e  l ikelihood of 
such an occurrence a s  shown in s t a t i s t i c s  of prevlous chapters. 
co- India. C o m m i s m  in  India does not seem 
t o  be gaining. 
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The r e a l  t e s t  of success of e i t h e r  the Soviet o r  
t he  American a id  progran In India i s  whether communism has 
increased i n  t h a t  country. 
O n  A p r i l  20, 1952, The Mew York Times reported t h a t  
leading Indian o f f i c i a l s  believed tha t  the  next f i v e  years  
would t e l l  if India was going Communist o r  not. It d i d  not. 
The same newspaper reported on December 17, 1952, t h a t  the 
Communist Party had a 50-50 chance t o  gain control  i n  the  
next e lec t ion .  It d i d  not. 
The only notable success of the Communist Party i n  
gaining p o l i t i c a l  power i n  India was In  the  S ta te  of Kerala, 
where it took control  i n  1957. Actually, t h i s  was not  so 
m c h  a show of popular support, but of factionalism among 
other  p a r t i e s ,  f o r  the Communists polled l e s s  than 35 per 
cent  of the  votes. The Indian Central Government reaoved 
the  Communist Party from power in Kerala i n  July of 1959. The 
e l e c t i o n s  held i n  February of 1960 resulted i n  the e lec t ion  of 
a th ree  par ty  coa l i t ion  which controls  eighty-nine s ea t s  i n  the 
Kerala Parliament as  opposed t o  twenty-eight s ea t s  f o r  the  
C0;mmulists. 
1 
Although communism remains a constant t h r ea t  t o  India,  
the l ikel ihood t h a t  they w i l l  gain power remains reaote. 
-- 
' ~ h e  -- New York Times, February 3, 1960, p. 6. 
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